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 Foreword 
This study is the outcome of a research project conducted by the German 
Development Institute (DIE) from late 2004 until the summer of 2006. The 
research included numerous personal and telephone interviews. Many of 
those interviewed made documents available. Various international institu-
tions also took part in a written survey. 
We would like to convey our sincere thanks to all those interviewed and 
all the individuals and institutions otherwise involved in the project for 
their cooperation and frankness. 
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Summary  
Background to and aim of the research project 
This study is the outcome of a research project conducted by the German 
Development Institute (DIE). The aim of the study is to contribute to a 
better understanding of the subject and to help improve both the ability of 
development actors to react to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in crisis 
situations and their conflict management options when engaging with 
NSAGs.  
The background to the research project comprises situations of violent 
conflict with which development policy is confronted in many countries 
and regions. NSAGs are one of the main features of intrastate conflicts and 
of many regional wars. Typical manifestations of NSAGs are rebel armies, 
groups led by warlords and gangs of terrorists. For the purposes of this 
study an NSAG is a group that challenges the state’s monopoly of power 
by its actions, and “engagement” with NSAGs means only carefully con-
sidered approaches to such groups. Engagement is not, then, equivalent to 
“cooperation” or to the explicit or implicit recognition or legitimation of 
an NSAG’s objectives or methods. 
Relevance of the subject 
Non-state armed groups are not a new phenomenon in conflicts anywhere 
in the world. Civil wars and other intrastate violent conflicts, which by 
their nature are characterized by the participation of NSAGs on at least 
one side, have dominated warfare since the end of the Second World War, 
so much so that war between states has increasingly become the exception 
rather than the rule. Nonetheless, it is only since the early 1990s that the 
international debate has increasingly turned to NSAGs in their various 
forms. The association with the end of the Cold War is no accident in this 
context. The dissolution of ideological bipolarity was the precondition for 
an action-guiding consensus to begin to emerge in the international com-
munity on the normative standards of security and development. With the 
popularization of the concept of “human security”, which advanced to 
become a new guiding concept of international efforts to ensure peace and 
prevent violence, attention has increasingly focused on those whose ac-
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tions are primarily responsible for guaranteeing – or endangering – human 
security.  
The growth of interest in NSAGs is particularly due to the proposition that 
the form of war has changed, which has become popular under the heading 
of “new wars”. According to this proposition, the dominant paradigm of 
war changed fundamentally with the end of the Cold War. The now pre-
dominant type of war, it is argued, differs not only from the classical wars 
between states but also from classical civil wars. Typical now is the priva-
tization of armed groups, the economization of motives for using force, the 
brutalization of strategies of violence and the criminalization of economies 
of violence. The change in the form that war takes is accompanied by the 
rise of new kinds of armed groups. 
The debate on engagement with NSAGs is also becoming increasingly 
relevant to development policy. The human security agenda assigns to 
development policy a key role in the prevention and management of vio-
lent conflicts, and especially in measures to combat structural causes of 
conflicts in poor societies and with respect to the civil components of 
crisis prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. 
In the majority of the countries that benefit from German development 
cooperation violent conflicts and thus NSAGs play a significant role. In 
the “Krisenfrühwarnung für das BMZ” (Early Crisis Warning for the 
BMZ) no fewer than 49 of the 91 countries examined in early 2006 were 
classified as affected or threatened by violent conflict. 
NSAGs in the international debate 
Engagement with NSAGs is a subject of international debate that has only 
recently attracted greater attention. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 have stimulated the debate considerably. However, they have also 
led to a growing tendency in the political sphere to view engagement with 
NSAGs primarily in the context of the war on terrorism.  
While the conduct of external actors towards states is governed by rela-
tively clear rules, engagement with non-state armed groups is difficult 
legal territory. For engagement with states external actors have a set 
framework in international law and the practice of international relations. 
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It is different with NSAGs: in only very few instances, or only indirectly, 
have they become the subject of international legal rules. They first played 
a role in international agreements shortly after the Second World War. In 
these cases, which arise from international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law or international criminal law, it is principally the conduct 
of NSAGs, not engagement with them, that is governed by rules. How-
ever, infringements by NSAGs of such rules of conduct have legally bind-
ing consequences for third countries when, for example, the latter are 
called upon to bring the accused before national or international courts. 
Attempts have recently been made to have NSAGs subscribe directly to 
obligations to comply with humanitarian norms. A pioneering initiative in 
this context is that of the international non-governmental organization 
(NGO) Geneva Call, which has been trying since 2000 to persuade non-
state participants in civil wars to comply with a voluntary undertaking that 
essentially corresponds to the provisions of the international treaty outlaw-
ing anti-personnel mines that entered into force in 1999 (Ottawa Conven-
tion). 
The international community’s increased involvement in the war on terror-
ism has generally turned engagement with NSAGs into a politically highly 
sensitive issue, since NSAGs are often seen and described internationally 
as terrorists by the governments they oppose. A practice that has particu-
larly serious consequences for engagement with NSAGs is the compilation 
by many states of official lists of organizations and individuals they regard 
as terrorists. The effectiveness of such lists is disputed. 
Important documents drawn up by high-level expert bodies and interna-
tional institutions have considered aspects of international security, the 
prevention or containment of civil wars, genocide and other forms of mass 
human rights violations in recent years. It is noticeable in this context that, 
although each of these documents devotes extensive passages to the fight 
against terrorism, none singles out engagement with NSAGs for discus-
sion. 
Engagement of external actors with NSAGs 
Although, as a general rule, engagement with NSAGs is fraught with diffi-
culties for any external actors in a country, the forms those difficulties take 
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differ with the actors’ perspective. Perspectives differ especially with areas 
of policy (diplomacy/foreign policy, security and defence policy, devel-
opment policy, internal affairs/internal security). It should be borne in 
mind that engagement cannot always be active, but – in keeping with the 
concept of engagement in communication studies – also includes such 
passive behaviours as unilateral perception or deliberate disregard, since 
they too are the consequence of political decisions and may have political 
impacts.  
In principle, however, all policies are bound by the principle of the sover-
eignty of international relations and the primacy of the state monopoly of 
power as guiding tenets of their international action. The limits to this 
principle have, however, long been debated. The recognition by the United 
Nations in 2005 of an international responsibility to protect population 
groups who do not enjoy (adequate) government protection in their own 
country has recently given foreign policy fresh scope, recognized in inter-
national law, for engagement with NSAGs. The implicit conclusion to be 
drawn from this restriction of the hitherto incontrovertible principle of 
sovereignty is that the opportunities for engaging with NSAGs cannot be 
properly assessed unless the overall political context, and especially the 
actions of the government concerned, is measured against the same stan-
dards with which NSAGs are expected to comply. If a government sys-
tematically violates human rights and, by so doing, itself helps to exacer-
bate conflicts, closer forms of engagement of external actors with an 
NSAG acting in this context seem more legitimate than when the govern-
ment’s conduct is generally acceptable in this respect. 
General requirements to be met specifically by the engagement of devel-
opment actors with NSAGs can be summarized as follows: 
• Any engagement with NSAGs should take a highly conflict-sensitive 
form and be situationally appropriate; this also means the conscious 
adoption of a position on state violence in each case.  
• In particular, the principle of “doing no harm” must be observed. 
• Engagement with NSAGs should not be an end in itself but a means 
to an important, clearly identifiable end. 
• The form of engagement should be legally defensible (against the 
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background inter alia of constantly evolving international criminal 
law). 
• It must also form part of an overall foreign policy strategy that com-
mits all external policy actors (especially in the areas of foreign, secu-
rity and development policy) to a coordinated and coherent approach. 
• Finally, it should be ethically defensible in the sense that the decision 
whether certain forms of engagement are acceptable is guided by 
principles that can be generalized. 
Behavioural patterns of NSAGs 
If it is to be possible to develop options for external actors when they 
engage with NSAGs, it is important to identify their behavioural patterns. 
This concerns not least their reliability in honouring agreements with ex-
ternal actors. Although it is impossible to identify patterns of engagement 
true of all types of NSAG, their behaviour is characterized by certain fac-
tors. The environment in which they move plays an important role in 
stamping certain characteristics, such as ideology, motivation, organiza-
tional structure, income base, networking, strategies and tactics. 
From the conduct of NSAGs it is possible to deduce various negative and 
positive indicators that tend to provide information on the risks and oppor-
tunities associated with the engagement of external actors with NSAGs. 
Important categories in this context are (a) an NSAG’s attitude towards 
political power (disdain or respect for the rule of law, etc.), (b) its attitude 
towards territory (control or no control over territory, etc.), (c) forms of 
social and economic support (acting in isolation from or with the support 
of the local population, etc.) and (d) the way in which force is used (seem-
ingly indiscriminate or targeted use or threat of force). 
NSAGs as a challenge for development policy 
There are many points of contact between development actors and 
NSAGs. The need to engage with NSAGs is not confined to those in-
volved with development policy, but extends to all actors operating in the 
countries affected. 
Past development policy strategies can be described roughly as follows: 
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until the 1990s official development policy sought, implicitly and explic-
itly, to avoid situations in which NSAGs posed a challenge. Action under 
official development policy was clearly geared to government actors in 
countries where NSAGs were in evidence (state bias). 
This challenge has often taken a different form for humanitarian and non-
governmental actors in the past. Examples of aid organizations gaining 
negotiated access to target groups at risk show that direct contact with 
NSAGs has often been unavoidable for humanitarian aid groups and in-
deed has frequently been sought by them. 
Since the mid-1990s the situation has changed for development policy. 
Increasing points of contact with NSAGs in the context of demobilization 
measures, for example, and the devising of concepts for crisis prevention 
and conflict management through development have given rise to a grow-
ing number of situations in which NSAGs have had practical relevance. 
Conceptual and operational considerations and missions in unstable situa-
tions in which action is increasingly taken parallel to or together with 
peace missions demonstrate the growing relevance of such situations. The 
scenarios range from those in which warlords are active in the context of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) through widespread violent 
crime in, say, Colombia to situations in many countries where traditional 
or new authorities have the potential to threaten the use of force or 
experience of doing so (Nigeria, Afghanistan, etc.). Despite the rising 
number of situations in which those engaged in development activities 
come into contact with NSAGs, virtually no systematic or even incidental 
thought was given to their conduct until the early 2000s. 
Need for carefully considered engagement with NSAGs 
In any action taken under development policies to prevent crises and man-
age conflicts (working on conflict) it is vital to take adequate account of 
NSAGs. The involvement of NSAGs is, however, equally essential where 
development policy is being implemented in situations in which they are 
present, but development policy has no direct bearing on armed conflicts 
or potential violence (working in or around conflict). Ignoring NSAGs 
similarly has effects on engagement with them, since it may mean that 
potential cannot be tapped, and their exclusion may influence the balance 
of power in a situation where, for example, the result is that the govern-
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ment is in fact strengthened or a region in which an NSAG is active is not 
considered. 
“Engagement” with NSAGs takes many forms. Negotiations with kidnap-
pers, agreements with NSAGs on transport routes for aid supplies, political 
appeals to NSAGs not to recruit child soldiers or to use land mines consti-
tute engagement just as much as deliberate cooperation with them and may 
have a certain legitimacy in regions where there is no government control.  
Engagement with NSAGs entails opportunities and risks, which may vary 
widely from one case to another. This being so, the debate on engagement 
with NSAGs reveals that ignoring NSAGs in situations where develop-
ment and other actors are involved results in failure to seize or at least to 
consider potentially creative opportunities and opportunities for exercising 
influence and possibly in the occurrence of unintended adverse effects.  
Where such opportunities are concerned, it is possible to identify four 
ideal-type motives that may underlie engagement with NSAGs in the de-
velopment policy context: 
1. Access to target groups: By engaging with NSAGs, development 
policy can pursue the objective of reaching target groups in an area.  
2. Responsibility for personnel: By working in a region where NSAGs 
are active, local and/or external development cooperation personnel 
may be exposed to considerable danger; more deliberate engagement 
can greatly reduce some of the risks. 
3. Commitment to norms: Engagement may also be of interest from the 
development angle as a means of helping to persuade an NSAG to 
commit itself to rules and standards (human rights, etc.). 
4. Conflict transformation: While access to target groups and responsi-
bility for personnel may often be reasons for beginning to engage 
with NSAGs, a further objective of engagement may be to contribute 
to conflict transformation.  
Patterns of engagement of German development policy with NSAGs: 
modi operandi, opportunities and risks 
Development policy interacts with NSAGs in many different ways. Devel-
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opment actors engage with NSAGs in all cooperating countries in which 
they are of any relevance. This is as true of German actors in the 
Casamance/Senegal and Tajikistan, for example, as it is of all other rele-
vant countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Soma-
lia, Uganda, Nigeria, Yemen, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Nepal, the 
Philippines and Colombia. Some NSAGs are “more accessible” to German 
and international development policy, other situations are more complex 
and, above all, politically more sensitive. 
As engagement varies from one case to another, generalizing on ap-
proaches is possible to only a limited degree. It concerns all the participat-
ing actors (BMZ, implementing organizations, local partners, German 
political foundations, other German non-governmental organizations). 
The options open to development actors for engagement with NSAGs can 
be roughly categorized as follows: 
• Avoidance of engagement: Development policy consciously or un-
consciously avoids countries, regions or situations in which NSAGs 
are involved. 
• Disregard / observation / involuntary engagement: Development 
policy is present in situations involving NSAGs, but takes no notice 
of them or tries not to become involved by resorting to “non-
behaviour” or to behaviour geared solely to observation. 
• Apolitical action / equidistance: Development policy endeavours to 
make development-related and sometimes even conflict-related con-
tributions, but they are deliberately kept apolitical. 
• Exclusion: Development policy supports the exclusion of NSAGs. 
• Cooperation: Development policy involves NSAGs directly in differ-
ent ways. This may consist in direct account being taken of them in 
measures and dialogue fora or in their acting as cooperation partners. 
Engagement with NSAGs may occur at different levels of development 
policy: 
• Strategy level: German development policy has yet to pay any direct 
conceptual attention to approaches to NSAGs.  
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• Political level: At political level – i.e. at places where levels of politi-
cal leadership are visibly involved or participating – discussions, for 
example, may be held with NSAG representatives.  
• Operational level: There is varied engagement during the preparation 
and implementation of development cooperation measures. 
• Promotion of international mechanisms: International fora and me-
chanisms for persuading NSAGs to commit themselves to rules and 
standards. 
The room for manoeuvre that development policy enjoys in relation to 
NSAGs is usually determined by the government of the country con-
cerned. This is especially true of countries with a generally efficient and 
legitimized government. A development policy approach explicitly op-
posed by the government is hardly conceivable or feasible. Where gov-
ernments are de facto weak, the monopoly of power is severely restricted 
and/or legitimacy is lacking, there may be some room for manoeuvre in 
other respects.  
It makes a difference of some considerable consequence whether a state 
and a non-state development actor engages with an NSAG. International 
non-governmental organizations quite obviously have very much more 
scope for developing forms of engagement with NSAGs. For official de-
velopment actors, on the other hand, the limits are sometimes more clearly 
recognizable. Nonetheless, they too certainly have some room for ma-
noeuvre. “Closer” engagement is likely to be problematical mainly when a 
conflict situation has become particularly “bogged down”, communication 
with the NSAG is explicitly unwanted, the approach does not have the 
firm backing of an international consensus, and the NSAGs have been 
guilty of particularly serious violations of rules and values. 
In general, engagement with NSAGs creates opportunities, but it also 
entails risks. A cost-benefit analysis of engagement in a situation that 
necessitates engagement with an NSAG is, as a general rule, an appropri-
ate means of exposing the possible effects of the approach adopted. 
The potential opportunities presented by engagement arise from the mo-
tives and aims pursued by development actors in this context (security for 
personnel, conflict-transformation objectives, etc.). Risks may be inherent 
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in the possible de facto enhancement of the international status of NSAGs 
as a result of engagement with external actors. Engagement, and especially 
cooperation, with an NSAG may also mean that this approach is inter-
preted by the government concerned as taking sides and that possible in-
fluence as a “neutral” partner is consequently reduced. If engagement 
means that resources reach areas to which NSAGs have access, the bal-
ance of power and resources may be affected and an NSAG’s ability to use 
force unwittingly reinforced. In any weighing up of opportunities and 
risks, however, the costs and benefits of not becoming involved or of en-
gagement/cooperation biased towards the government must also be con-
sidered. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Each case should be taken on its merits when the conditions for and the 
risks and opportunities associated with NSAG engagement with develop-
ment and other external actors are assessed. Nonetheless, some advice can 
be given to development actors: 
• Territorial control: Engagement with groups completely or largely in 
control of an area may be particularly necessary at least from a hu-
manitarian viewpoint and for obtaining information. 
• Form in which force is used and threatened: The more an NSAG uses 
or threatens to use force (extending to acts of terrorism), the less 
likely it is that direct engagement is appropriate or wise. 
• State or non-state actor: Examples show that it may be more appro-
priate to leave responsibility for apparent “non-state” armed groups to 
the state and not to ease the pressure on it by accepting government 
rhetoric that denies responsibility for armed groups that are de facto 
associated with the state. 
• Value added by engagement: Engagement is not an end in itself and 
should be sought only when constructive influence seems possible. 
• One’s own rules and values: One’s own system of rules and values 
should be clear to all actors involved. One’s position on the use of 
force and the violation of human rights must always be beyond doubt. 
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• International backing for engagement: Engagement with an NSAG 
requires very extensive international agreement on the approach to 
the groups concerned. 
• Shortages of information on NSAGs: Information on the goals, na-
ture, structure and approach of NSAGs is vital for fundamental as-
pects of engagement with them. 
• Intermediaries and civil contacts with NSAGs: In many cases it may 
be an option to communicate with NSAGs indirectly, through inter-
mediaries, for example. 
• Basis of legitimacy of NSAGs and the state: Legitimacy is a factor 
that must be considered when it comes to deciding whether and, if so, 
in what form engagement is appropriate. The legitimacy dimension is 
often complex because it must also be related inter alia to government 
actors. 
• Willingness for dialogue / negotiation: Engagement may depend on 
the extent to which an NSAG is seriously interested in participating 
in negotiation or dialogue.  
For the BMZ and other development actors the following recommenda-
tions can be derived from the above: 
• The NSAG issue is very important; it should be paid greater attention. 
• The BMZ should therefore target efforts in Germany and at interna-
tional level (within the DAC, for example) on promoting an exchange 
of experience. 
• The BMZ might join with other government departments (especially 
the Foreign and Defence Ministries) in exchanging experience of en-
gagement with NSAGs. A discussion of the subject within the Inter-
departmental Group on Civil Crisis Prevention should be considered. 
• Promoting such initiatives as Geneva Call or specialist conferences 
(e.g. Conciliation Resources) attended by actors directly involved 
(NSAGs, governments concerned, etc.) is an important means of pus-
hing the topic forward. 
• The BMZ should prepare a hand-out giving the expert public and 
implementing organizations advice on engagement with NSAGs. 
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1 Introduction 
Background to and aim of the study 
This study is the outcome of a research project conducted by the German 
Development Institute (DIE). The background to the research project com-
prises situations of violent conflict with which development policy is 
confronted in many countries and regions. Non-state armed groups 
(NSAGs) are one of the main features of intrastate conflicts and of many 
regional wars. Typical manifestations of non-state armed groups are rebel 
armies, groups led by warlords and gangs of terrorists. The nature of the 
groupings concerned varies widely. NSAGs may pursue economic, politi-
cal, religious or cultural interests. The interests of these groupings often 
change with time.  
Research on the subject of non-state armed groups has increased since the 
late 1990s. The debate on the role of external actors (such as development 
donors) and their engagement with NSAGs has, however, only just begun. 
Few conceptual and empirical studies have been carried out. 
Situations involving NSAGs represent a challenge for external actors in 
many respects, this being true of donors at international level (United 
Nations, World Bank, European Union) and at bilateral level and equally 
for international non-governmental organizations. Should donors commu-
nicate (informally or formally) with NSAGs that de facto constitute the 
ruling power in certain areas? What approach should be adopted towards 
NSAGs performing quasi-state functions, such as the provision of basic 
social services? Is dialogue with NSAGs necessary if endangered target 
groups are to be reached? Should external actors avoid contact with 
NSAGs so that they are not de facto legitimized by receiving international 
public attention? Is peace-making potential neglected if NSAGs are ex-
cluded from constructive conflict management funded by external actors? 
These and other wide-ranging questions form the context of the research 
project. 
The aim of the project and the present study is to contribute to a better 
understanding of the subject and to help improve both the ability of devel-
opment actors to react to NSAGs in crisis situations and their conflict 
management options when engaging with NSAGs. The findings are in-
tended to give donors some ideas and to contribute to current research 
activities at national and international level. 
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The empirical study initially centres on experience gained during German 
development cooperation. That experience is likely to be typical, by and 
large, of many bilateral donors, although comparable studies have yet to 
be undertaken in other countries. In the case of multilateral or international 
development institutions, some of the aspects of engagement with NSAGs 
described here will undoubtedly differ, because the countries concerned 
will normally be members of those organizations, and the room for ma-
noeuvre will therefore be largely determined a priori by the government. 
Here again, relevant studies have yet to emerge. 
Definitions 
The study employs a number of terms that are not always used to mean the 
same thing in the international debate. They include the terms “non-state 
armed group” itself and “engagement”, the very terms, in other words, on 
which this study pivots. Particularly contentious, moreover, is the term 
“terrorism”, especially when qualified by the adjective “international”. 
The meanings of all three terms taken as a basis in this study will therefore 
be briefly explained at this juncture. They, or the problems associated with 
them, will be discussed in greater depth where appropriate in the following 
chapters. 
a) Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) 
By non-state armed groups (NSAGs) we mean groups that challenge the 
state’s monopoly of power by their actions. This definition is based on 
reflections during the Armed Groups Project at the University of Calgary 
in Canada (formerly attached to the University of British Columbia). The 
reference to an abstract conceptuality of state and monopoly of power – 
rather than additive features, as frequently introduced into the debate – has 
a number of advantages, as will be explained at length in Chapter 2.2. 
Among other things, such a definition enables it to be shown why certain 
groups are regarded as NSAGs, while others are not. 
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b) Engagement 
For the purposes of this study “engagement”1 means only a carefully con-
sidered approach to such groups. Engagement is not, then, equivalent to 
“cooperation” or to the explicit or implicit recognition or legitimation of 
an NSAG’s objectives or methods.  
“Engagement” with NSAGs takes many forms. Negotiations with kidnap-
pers, agreements with NSAGs on transport routes for aid supplies, political 
appeals to NSAGs not to use child soldiers or landmines constitute en-
gagement just as much as deliberate cooperation with them and may have 
a certain legitimacy in regions where there is no government control. In 
other words, engagement is a value-free term based solely on points of 
contact between development (or other) actors and NSAGs. 
c) (International) terrorism 
The attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001 have made “international 
terrorism” a prominent issue of international politics. This also has consid-
erable influence on engagement with NSAGs. It is very important, for 
example, to know which NSAGs are deemed to be or are officially classi-
fied as terrorist groups. An international agreement or formal definition 
has yet to be adopted, since an appropriate categorization depends in many 
respects on perspective. Familiar examples of at least occasional differ-
ences within the international community when it comes to judging 
whether or not the actions of groups constitute terrorism are the struggles 
for liberation in Latin America and Africa and the use of force in the Pal-
estine-Israeli conflict.2 
Another contentious question is whether “international terrorism” – as 
opposed to “terrorism” – is a significant subcategory or a phenomenon sui 
generis or whether the term tends to perform a political-rhetorical function 
that adds nothing of substance to a general concept of terrorism. The latter 
view is supported by the virtual absence anywhere in the world of terror-
                                                          
1 See, for example, Ricigliano (2005, 4). 
2 Zunzer (2005, 9) refers to the legally important, but in practice unclear, distinction 
between terrorism and resistance permitted by international law in the assessment of 
acts of violence. 
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ism that does not have a cross-frontier and thus “international” dimension. 
Scepticism about the term “international terrorism” can be inferred inter 
alia from the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Both that report and An-
nan’s report “In larger freedom” submitted to the UN General Assembly 
in March 2005 consider the problem of terrorism organized in transna-
tional networks at some length, without ever using the term “international 
terrorism” (UN 2004; Annan 2005). 
In his report “In larger freedom” the UN Secretary-General appeals to the 
international community to develop a common understanding of terrorism 
and, to this end, proposes a definition based on the report of the High-level 
Panel. Although it eventually proved impossible to reach an international 
consensus at the UN General Assembly in September 2005, the definition 
proposed by Annan is helpful and will serve as the basis for the present 
study: 
“I endorse fully the High-level Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism, 
which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already pro-
scribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is 
intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling 
a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from 
doing any act.”3 
Structure of the study 
The following chapter, Chapter 2, begins by explaining the context and 
relevance of “engagement with non-state armed groups” to international 
policy in general and development policy in particular, identifying the 
views of the issue taken by those involved in the various externally ori-
ented policies. 
                                                          
3 Annan (2005, 26). In the German-speaking area, a definition with a somewhat different 
focus, but one that is essentially similar, has been suggested by Peter Waldmann (2005, 
15): “Terrorism comprises planned, shocking violent attacks on a political system from 
the underground. They are intended to generate general uncertainty and terror, but also 
sympathy and willingness to lend support.” 
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Chapter 3 considers patterns of engagement with non-state armed groups, 
the discussion covering the ideologies and motives of NSAGs, their organ-
izational structures, their relationship with the state and its role in conflict 
situations, the revenue base of NSAGs, their strategies and tactics, the 
reliability of agreements with them and their willingness to resolve con-
flicts. 
Chapter 4 identifies the points of contact to be seen between NSAGs and 
development policy and, on this basis, explains why development actors 
should consider engagement with NSAGs carefully. 
Against this background, Chapter 5 analyses the empirical experience of 
development actors engaging with NSAGs: what patterns of engagement 
are to be observed, and what characterizes them? What peculiarities arise 
for various external actors? What opportunities does engagement present, 
what risks does it entail? 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings in the form of conclusions and 
puts forward various recommendations for the BMZ and other develop-
ment actors. 
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2 Engagement with non-state armed groups:  
context and relevance of the subject 
This chapter begins (2.1) by explaining why and in what contexts non-
state armed groups have recently gained in significance and what rele-
vance this has to development policy. This is followed (2.2) by a definition 
of non-state armed groups that is guided by their attitude to the state’s core 
function – safeguarding the monopoly of power. This section also dis-
cusses the problem of assigning such designations as rebels, guerrillas and 
terrorists to individual NSAGs. Section 2.3 turns to the international de-
bate on NSAGs and looks into major changes of course that have influ-
enced the perception of NSAGs at international level. In section 2.4 the 
problem of engagement with NSAGs is examined from the perspective of 
various policies. Finally, a number of general requirements to be met by 
development policy when engaging with NSAGs are deduced from the 
previous deliberations. 
2.1 NSAGs gaining in significance 
Non-state armed groups are not a new phenomenon in conflicts anywhere 
in the world. Civil wars and other intrastate violent conflicts, which, by 
their nature, are characterized by the participation of NSAGs on at least 
one side, have dominated warfare since the end of the Second World War, 
so much so that war between states has increasingly become the exception 
rather than the rule (see Box 1). 
Nonetheless, it is only since the early 1990s that NSAGs in their widely 
varying forms have increasingly become a subject of international debate. 
The association with the end of the Cold War is no accident. The dissolu-
tion of ideological bipolarity was the precondition for an action-guiding 
consensus to begin to emerge in the international community on the nor-
mative standards of security and development. With the popularization of 
the concept of “human security”, which has advanced to become a new 
guiding concept of international efforts to ensure peace and prevent vio-
lence, attention has increasingly focused on those whose actions are pri-
marily responsible for guaranteeing – or endangering – human security. 
Any involvement of external actors in violent intrastate conflicts, whether 
with humanitarian intentions, for peace-making purposes or in pursuit of 
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development goals, is thus exposed to the need to see state and non-state 
actors as part of the conflict situation and to decide what attitude to adopt 
towards them. 
The growth of interest in NSAGs is particularly due to the proposition that 
the form of war has changed, which has become popular under the heading 
of “new wars”. According to this proposition, the dominant paradigm of 
war changed fundamentally with the end of the Cold War (Kaldor 1999; 
Münkler 2003; LpBBW 2004). The now predominant type of war, it is 
argued, differs not only from the classical wars between states – which 
had, in any case, become a thing of the past with the end of the Second 
World War – but also from classical civil wars. Typical now is the privati-
zation of armed groups, the economization of the motives for using force, 
the brutalization of strategies of violence and the criminalization of 
economies of violence (Heupel / Zangl 2004). Although critics of the “new 
Box 1:  Civil wars determine the global conflict scene  
Civil wars account for the vast majority of hostile situations in the world. Ac-
cording to surveys conducted by the Heidelberg Institute for International Con-
flict Research (HIIK), the number of interstate wars in the period from 1945 to 
2004 remained stable at between two and ten separate conflicts a year (falling 
to zero twice, in 1995 and 2004), whereas intrastate violent conflicts increas-
ingly dominated the global conflict scene: from 1947 to 1964 between ten and 
twenty “high-intensity conflicts” within states were counted each year and 
between fifteen and thirty up to 1981. Since then the figure has never fallen 
below 25, has usually exceeded 30 and, in 1992-1994, reached the highest 
figure yet, 44. In 2003 and 2004 the HIIK counted, respectively, 34 and 36 
intrastate high-intensity conflicts throughout the world (see Figure A1 in the 
annex).  
The dominance of violent intrastate conflicts in global warfare is also con-
firmed by studies which, unlike the HIIK’s, detect a decline in violent conflicts 
in the 1990s, examples being the Human Security Report, recently published 
for the first time (see Figure A2 in the annex), the report of the UN Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which uses 
the same figures, and the analyses carried out by the Study Group on the 
Causes of War (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg (see Figures A3 and A4 
in the annex). 
Sources:  HIIK (2004, 5); Human Security Centre (2005, 23);  
UN (2004, 33); AKUF (2004, 4) 
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wars” proposition object that the features cited are by no means as new as 
claimed, but were to be observed, for example, as long ago as the Thirty 
Years’ War, supporters of the proposition maintain that novelty is claimed 
not for the individual features as such but for the much increased simulta-
neity of their occurrence. This, they say, is evident from the average of 
civil wars since 1990 and can also be systematically explained: the end to 
ideological bipolarity and to the support received by the parties to civil 
wars from the rival superpowers deprived civil war of important mecha-
nisms for disciplining the warring factions. Some civil wars came to a 
standstill as a result, others were able to cease being dependent on external 
support and so to develop into “new wars”. 
The change in the form of war is accompanied by the rise of new kinds of 
armed group. While the salient feature of civil wars had always been the 
intrusion of private armed groups on the state’s monopoly on war, the new 
(civil) wars are characterized by the fact “that the degree of organization 
of the armed groups decreases, hierarchical structures thus increasingly 
fragment and the individual fighters are able to act with growing inde-
pendence from the leadership […], that new kinds of private actor increas-
ingly intervene in the hostilities, operating with greater independence from 
one another” (Heupel 2005, 24). The most prominent actor in the new 
wars is seen to be the warlord, who “performs the functions of leading 
soldier, political leader and businessman” (Heupel 2005, 25).  
The debate on engagement with NSAGs is also becoming increasingly 
relevant to development policy. The human security agenda assigns a key 
role to development policy in the prevention and management of violent 
conflicts, and especially in measures to combat structural causes of con-
flict in poor societies and with regard to the civil components of crisis 
prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Development 
policy is becoming involved in a growing number of cases and with an 
increasing depth of intervention in countries and situations characterized 
or seriously threatened by violent conflict – not least because it is realized 
that poverty and violent conflict can combine to form an upward spiral and 
so ruin opportunities for development for a long time to come (Box 2). 
Accordingly, development actors are increasingly confronted with the 
existence and actions of NSAGs.  
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This finding is, however, also true of German development cooperation, 
since violent conflicts play a significant role for the majority of Germany’s 
partner countries. In the “Krisenfrühwarnung für das BMZ” (Early Crisis 
Warning for the BMZ) no fewer than 49 of the 91 countries examined in 
early 2006 were classified as affected or threatened by violent conflict. 
Seventeen of those countries were involved either in a “violent conflict” 
(three) or in a “violent conflict in parts of the country” (fourteen), and 
fifteen had entered a “post-violent-conflict” phase.4 In a further seventeen 
of Germany’s partner countries the early-warning system identified an 
increased (fourteen) or even an acute (three) need for preventive action. 
                                                          
4 A country will remain in the “post-violent-conflict” category for up to 10 years after a 
violent conflict has ended. 
Box 2:  Hardest hit by civil wars are the world’s poorest countries  
According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a third of the 
poor live on less than a US dollar a day in “fragile” states, which are character-
ized either by a civil war or at least by a significantly greater risk of violence 
breaking out. These countries are home to half of all the world’s children who 
die before the age of 5, more than a third of all women who die in childbirth, a 
third of all people without access to drinking water and more than a third of 
those affected by Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (HIV/ AIDS). Violent intrastate conflicts therefore represent 
a serious obstacle to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Not only is military force a major cause of poverty. Statistical studies indicate 
just how significant the effects in the opposite direction are: poverty, and espe-
cially deficient economic development, is one of the main causes of violent 
conflict and increases the danger of civil war in a country many times over. 
Oxford economist Paul Collier and his colleagues conclude in the World Bank 
study “Breaking the Conflict Trap” that the more than one billion people living 
in low-income countries throughout the world are exposed to a risk of civil war 
that is fifteen times greater than the risk with which the societies of the OECD 
world have to live. 
Sources:  OECD (2005); Collier et al. (2003) 
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2.2 What are NSAGs? 
NSAGs manifest themselves in very different forms, ranging from separa-
tist organizations, such as the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or 
Tamil Tigers), in the north of Sri Lanka, to militant anti-system parties, 
such as the Maoists in Nepal. Some NSAGs evidently place the emphasis 
on political objectives, others seem to be primarily out for economic gain. 
NSAGs may be notorious – as is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Uganda – for spreading fear and terror among the population, or they may 
be firmly anchored – like the Palestinian Hamas – in their society of origin 
and occasionally perform quasi-state functions (“states-within-states”, 
Kingston / Spears 2004). Some NSAGs – like the Chechnyan separatists – 
may be opposed by the official government with all the means at its dis-
posal, others – like the SPLA/M in Sudan – are, after years of conflict, 
engaged in comprehensive peace processes and eventually a new peaceful 
order, while yet others – such as the Janjaweed militias in the west Suda-
nese province of Darfur – operate with the connivance or even open sup-
port of the government. NSAGs may be clearly structured and well organ-
ized underground parties or fighting units; but they may also acquire their 
capacity for action primarily from traditional relations among their mem-
bers based on mutual obligations or merely take the form of loose-knit 
“gangs of bandits” (Annan 2004, 13). 
Despite the growing use of the term “NSAG”, however, a definition of 
precisely what is meant is rarely given in the context of a debate. The term 
is often used as a value-free collective description which – unlike, for 
example, the designations “terrorists” or “liberation army” – does not 
entail the adoption of a normative position and can therefore be used in 
diplomatic contexts.5 Introductions to these terms do not, as a rule, do any 
more than cite examples of “typical” NSAGs (rebels, warlords, terrorists, 
etc.). What remains unclear in a collective description of this kind is pre-
cisely what all NSAGs have in common. If, however, it is assumed, as in 
this study, that, through their existence, NSAGs represent a particular 
                                                          
5 Thus the 2004 Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Protection of Civil-
ians in Armed Conflict includes a section on the “responsibility of non-State armed 
groups” (Annan 2004, 13). 
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challenge for policy such as development policy, it must also be possible 
to name the specific quality that gives rise to that challenge. 
In this study we take NSAGs to be groups which, through their actions, 
challenge the state’s monopoly of power. This definition is guided by 
observations by Pablo Policzer, co-director of the Armed Groups Project 
launched at the University of British Columbia in Canada (Policzer 
2005a). Rather than regarding a large number of additive features as con-
stituting NSAGs (e.g. elementary command structure; use of force; politi-
cal goals; independence from state control), Policzer recommends that 
NSAGs be defined by reference to their attitude towards the core function 
of the state, i.e. the institution which, according to Max Weber’s classical 
definition, “(successfully) claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force within a certain area.”6 Recourse to the monopoly of 
power thus defined is especially appropriate for development policy be-
cause it is the questioning of the state’s monopoly of power that causes the 
problems which make engagement with NSAGs so complicated for the 
international donor community: a state that is deficient in its exercise of 
the monopoly of power; inadequate legitimacy of the armed group; a pre-
carious security situation for domestic and foreign actors due to the com-
peting claims to power. 
A definition of this kind also permits an explanation as to why certain 
groups are regarded as NSAGs, while others are not. Thus not every kind 
of gang crime constitutes an elementary attack on the state’s monopoly of 
power; forms of organized crime that pose a general and fundamental 
threat to human security should, on the other hand, be taken into account. 
Paramilitary groups exercising power in coalition with the state, but ulti-
mately for their own purposes, must be seen as NSAGs because they are 
not subject to the peremptory command and control of the state and so 
undermine its monopoly of power; such other paramilitary units as bar-
racked police and standing troops of a home affairs or disaster relief minis-
try which are integrated into the regular command structures of state hier-
archies are not, on the other hand, covered by the definition of NSAGs. 
                                                          
6 What is left open in this context is whether NSAGs challenge the state’s monopoly of 
power because it is not performing its core functions or whether, conversely, it is the 
emergence of NSAGs that weakens the state in the exercise of its monopoly of power.  
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Table 1 gives an overview of non-state parties to violent conflicts in coun-
tries in whose development Germany is involved. The table makes no 
claim to be complete, but is meant to help show the range and spread of 
non-state armed groups. 
A particular problem that has only recently begun to attract greater inter-
national attention is that of traditional authorities that are held in high 
esteem at local level and are therefore capable of exercising in “their” 
territory extralegal power rivalling that of central government.7 The prob-
lems associated with this kind of parastatal authority for external actors 
can be observed, for example, in Central Asia (Afghanistan, Tajikistan) 
and parts of Africa, where foreign organizations have to cope with the fact 
that their project partners, organized in local NGOs, may also be respected 
tribal leaders capable, when the need arises, of mobilizing armed militias 
at short notice. As, then, they persistently challenge the state’s legitimate 
monopoly of power, such traditional authorities are similarly seen as 
NSAGs as defined above. This also follows on from the recent debate on 
“states-within-states” (Kingston / Spears 2004), contradictory dynamics 
within states (Schlichte 2005) and “areas of limited statehood” (Risse 
2005), from which it is clear that, although alternative, internationally 
unrecognized forms of “statehood” may pose a major security problem, 
they are still far from uncommon in many countries outside the OECD 
world and, moreover, often perform in “normal times” important quasi-
state functions in areas where the formally responsible state fails because 
it is unable or unwilling. 
The designations commonly used for different manifestations of NSAGs 
reflect the wide range of the phenomenon, but rarely permit really clear 
distinctions to be made. The use of such designations as “rebels”, “libera-
tion army”, “guerrillas”, “militia”, “paramilitary groups”, “warlords”, 
“mercenaries”, “private security companies”, “terrorists”, “insurgents” and 
“organized crime” for certain groups is usually guided by how pronounced 
certain distinctive features are (political or economic motivation; level of 
                                                          
7 The exercise of this extralegal, parastatal power is the decisive feature that distinguishes 
the forms of traditional authority alluded to here from other traditional forms that are le-
gally integrated into existing political systems and, as such, are to be found to a greater 
or lesser degree in every society. 
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organization; territorial range; target groups for violence), but, as a rule, so 
many criteria are applied that, on the whole, no systematically conclusive 
typologies emerge. If, for example, warlords are defined as regionally 
limited and primarily economically oriented actors in constant conflict 
with any competing authority, whereas rebels have different politico-
religious aims and paramilitary groups are characterized mainly by their 
opposition to the enemies of the regime (Zunzer 2005, 19), such rebel 
armies as the LRA that use force extensively against the civilian popula-
tion, and warlords who personify a claim to political power against the 
central government are left in a definitional vacuum. Other classification 
systems use as many as ten (!) different “characteristics” to distinguish 
types of NSAG (Wagener 2005), only to stop at a mere three or four sub-
types derived from them and without solving the problem of the almost 
infinite number of alternative combinations of features. 
The conceptual difficulty of defining NSAGs is joined by the empirical 
problem of appropriate attribution. Whether one group is regarded as 
composed of rebels or common criminals, another as consisting of guerril-
las or terrorists is often – not least because of the different normative im-
plications in each case – primarily a question of perspective and some-
times merely a question of time, as the development and external percep-
tion of many NSAGs in protracted violent conflicts demonstrates. Even 
the occasional dominance of an NSAG’s own attribution or of an external 
attribution may determine whether it is seen by the international public as 
a terrorist grouping or a liberation army. By analogy with Wagener (2005, 
84–86), it is possible to identify three basic problems facing any attempt at 
an empirically accurate typology of actual NSAGs: (a) precise data on the 
characteristics of a group are usually difficult to obtain; (b) groupings may 
be active in terms of various characteristics, since it is  often  impossible to 
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reduce actual NSAGs to one dominant motive, one principal opponent, 
one clear territorial reference unit or one typical form of the use of force; 
in such cases, an “average focus of activities” can at best be identified; and 
(c) as groups change with time, they may be at a “transitional typological 
stage” for relatively long periods. 
For the purpose of drawing analytical distinctions between different 
NSAGs, this study therefore refers primarily to abstract features capable of 
generalization, without associating them directly with designations com-
monly used for types of NSAG. Where such terms as warlords and rebels 
are used, on the other hand, they are intended for illustrative purposes and 
relate to specific groupings to which these labels are attached. 
2.3 Engagement with NSAGs in the international debate 
As a subject of international debate, engagement with NSAGs has only 
recently attracted greater attention. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 stimulated the debate considerably. However, it has also led to a 
growing tendency in the political sphere to view engagement with NSAGs 
primarily in the context of the war on terrorism.  
While the conduct of external actors towards states is governed by rela-
tively clear rules, engagement with non-state armed groups is difficult 
legal territory. For engagement with states external actors have, in interna-
tional law and the practice of international relations, a set framework of 
established rules and standards of conduct. It is different with NSAGs: in 
only very few instances, or only indirectly, have they become the subject 
of international legal rules. They first played a role in international agree-
ments shortly after the Second World War, when, in 1949, the Geneva 
Conventions were revised and extended to cover parties to non-
international conflicts. In this and other cases arising from international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law or international criminal 
law, it is, however, principally the conduct of NSAGs, not engagement 
with them, that is governed by rules (see Box 3). However, infringements 
by NSAGs of such rules of conduct may have legally binding conse-
quences for third countries when, for example, the latter are called upon to 
bring the accused before national or international courts, as was the case 
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when the ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of the leaders of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda in the autumn of 2005 (ICC 2005). 
Box 3:  The liability of NSAGs in international law  
In 2002 Liesbeth Zegveld undertook an extensive study of the liability of 
“armed opposition groups” for infringements of international law. The conclu-
sion she reaches is that the pertinent provisions in the relevant areas of interna-
tional law are directly binding on different actors in each case. Thus interna-
tional human rights law is addressed primarily to states. In principle, they are 
under an obligation to prevent human rights violations in their territory, includ-
ing those committed by NSAGs. International criminal law is aimed primarily 
at individuals accused of certain offences, such as war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, but also at states, since it is for them to guarantee that the accused in 
such cases are prosecuted. (With due regard for subsidiarity and complementar-
ity, this has now become possible under the Rome Statute before the Interna-
tional Criminal Court in The Hague.) NSAGs collectively would, on the other 
hand, be considered under the terms of international humanitarian law.  
International humanitarian law includes, in particular, the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions for the protection of the wounded (I and II), prisoners of war (III) 
and civilians (IV) in armed conflicts, to which over 180 states throughout the 
world have so far acceded. Unlike its predecessors, which dated back to 1864, 
these Conventions were the first to stipulate that a number of protective provi-
sions also apply in non-international conflicts and are binding on all parties to a 
conflict, including any non-state parties involved (Article 3 in all four conven-
tions). In 1977, two additional protocols extended the protection of victims of 
armed conflicts, one being explicitly devoted to the victims of “non-
international armed conflicts”.  
The practical relevance of these provisions of international humanitarian law 
suffers from the fact that, formally, it is primarily the accession (or non-
accession) to the Conventions of a state affected by a civil war that determines 
whether an armed group, which often disputes the very legitimacy of that state, 
is similarly to be bound by the Geneva Conventions. However, there have also 
been NSAGs in the past that have subscribed voluntarily to the provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the case-law of international criminal 
courts shows a growing tendency to view parts of the Conventions as custom-
ary international law and so to treat them as universally valid, irrespective of 
the accession of states or voluntary commitments. 
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Attempts have recently been made to have NSAGs subscribe directly to 
obligations to comply with humanitarian norms. A pioneering initiative in 
this context is that of the international NGO Geneva Call, which, since 
2000, has been trying to persuade non-state participants in civil wars to 
comply with a voluntary undertaking which essentially corresponds to the 
provisions of the international treaty outlawing anti-personnel mines that 
entered into force in 1999 (Ottawa Convention). The NSAGs involved will 
be the first to sign a set of rules – the “Deed of Commitment” – that is 
internationally respected (and also politically endorsed by such interna-
tional actors as the EU), although this does not imply any preliminary 
decision on the possible status of NSAGs in international law (Hofmann 
2004). Legal sanctions cannot, of course, be directly imposed for failure to 
comply with a voluntary commitment, but there is a danger of loss of 
reputation (“naming and shaming”), which may hamper an NSAG’s ca-
pacity for international action. With this initiative, which had been joined 
by some 30 NSAGs in eight African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries 
by the end of 2005, Geneva Call has created a model whose applicability 
to other humanitarian areas, especially in relation to the protection of the 
civilian population, is currently under discussion (Geneva Call 2004, 25–
28). The positive impulse that has emanated from experience of the Ge-
neva Call mechanism so far has also extended beyond the humanitarian 
sphere and helped to ensure that increasingly proactive consideration is 
given in the international debate to standards, forms and limits applicable 
to engagement with NSAGs that take account both of the public interest in  
the prosecution of those guilty of serious crimes and of the requirements to 
be met if there is to be a constructive de-escalation of conflict (Capie / 
Policzer 2004). 
In 2004 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan devoted a whole section of his 
annual Report to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict to the “Responsibility of non-state armed groups”. In this he called on 
the international community to support dialogue between humanitarian agen-
cies and NSAGs with a mix of political pressure and bilateral diplomacy and 
to make NSAGs’ compliance with humanitarian norms an important yardstick 
if it should one day be a question of recognizing the right of representatives of 
an armed group to participate in a post-war government. 
Sources:  Zegveld (2002); Geneva Convention (1949a, 1949b, 1949c,  
 1949d); Additional Protocol (1977a, 1977b); Annan (2004) 
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The international community’s increased involvement in the war on terror-
ism has generally turned engagement with NSAGs into a politically highly 
sensitive issue, since NSAGs are often seen and described internationally 
as terrorists by the governments they oppose. Important documents drawn 
up by high-level expert bodies and international institutions have consid-
ered aspects of international security, the prevention or containment of 
civil wars, genocide and other forms of mass human rights violations in 
recent years. They include, in particular, the report entitled “Responsibility 
to Protect” (ICISS 2001), the report of the “High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change” compiled for the UN Secretary-General, his own 
report “In Larger Freedom” to the UN General Assembly, drawn up to 
mark the UN Anniversary Summit in September 2005 (Annan 2005), and 
the Final Document of the UN Summit (UN 2005). It is noticeable in this 
context that, although each of these documents devotes extensive passages 
to the fight against terrorism, none singles out engagement with NSAGs 
for discussion. 
A practice that has particularly serious consequences for engagement with 
NSAGs is the compilation by many states of official lists of organizations 
and individuals they regard as terrorists. The USA and the European Un-
ion in particular keep such lists, on which they base a number of sanctions. 
The EU’s list of terrorists, which has been updated every six months since 
first being compiled in December 2001, is specifically intended to prevent 
the listed organizations and individuals from receiving financial support, 
to freeze any bank accounts and to facilitate cooperation among police and 
judicial authorities (EU 2001). The NSAGs appearing on the EU list in 
May 2006 included the Palestinian organization Hamas, Colombia’s 
FARC, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Philippines’ New People’s Army 
(EU 2006). 
The effectiveness of such lists is disputed. Critics object that the stigmati-
zation of individual groups often fails to take account of local require-
ments. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also voiced criticism in May 
2004. In his annual Report to the Security Council on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict he took a negative view of the consequences 
of lists of terrorists for the pursuit of humanitarian interests (Annan 2004, 
13): 
“Promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human 
rights norms and providing humanitarian assistance to populations in 
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areas under the control of armed groups require dialogue with those 
groups, whether they are highly organized with strong ideologi-
cal/political motivations or gangs of bandits. The designation of certain 
non-State armed groups as terrorist organizations has had an adverse 
impact on opportunities for humanitarian negotiations. The prohibition 
on dialogue with armed groups in Colombia, for example, has resulted 
in severe restrictions on access to populations in need.” 
In the same document Annan called for a coherent approach by the inster-
national community to engagement with NSAGs so as to prevent them 
from manipulating international aid operations. Such a consensus, which 
should primarily concern the humanitarian sphere, has yet to be achieved. 
2.4 External actors engaging with NSAGs: views from the 
standpoint of various policies 
Although, as a general rule, engagement with NSAGs is fraught with diffi-
culties for any external actors in a country, the forms these difficulties take 
differ as a function of the actor’s perspective, and perspectives differ from 
one area of policy to another (diplomacy/foreign policy, security and de-
fence policy, development policy, internal affairs/internal security). It 
should be borne in mind that “engagement” cannot always be active, but – 
in keeping with the concept of engagement in communication studies (see 
Box 4) – also includes such passive behaviours as unilateral perception or 
conscious disregard, since they too are the consequence of political deci-
sions and may have political impacts. The following outlines in highly 
stylized form the views of engagement with NSAGs from the standpoint 
of various policies in order to illustrate the general context with which 
development policy has to contend when it sets out to lay down standards 
of conduct for engagement with NSAGs or to review existing positions. 
The comments are therefore confined to the views in the OECD world (i.e. 
the most important development donor countries) on engagement with 
NSAGs. It is in this sense that the term “external actors” should be under-
stood: it does not include, for example, the neighbours of countries in 
conflict.  
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Foreign policy 
Seen from a classical diplomatic/foreign policy perspective, NSAGs are 
highly unlikely communication partners for external state actors. Their 
negative attitude to the monopoly of power held by the state concerned 
puts them outside the world of international relations. Non-engagement is 
the typical behaviour of foreign policy actors towards NSAGs. This is due 
to the principle of sovereignty in international law, which is closely allied 
with the requirement of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs 
of state and the principle of the territorial integrity of internationally rec-
ognized states.  
Foreign policy actors therefore tend to deny any engagement with NSAGs 
whatsoever. This is, however, based on a very narrow understanding of 
“engagement”. In fact, engagement cannot be prevented unilaterally, be-
cause even an actor’s conscious refusal of direct contact sends a message 
to the other side and must therefore be regarded at least as indirect com-
munication or engagement. Such fundamental considerations are joined by 
the fact that foreign policy actors cannot always choose the partners with 
whom they communicate directly. A clear example of this is provided by 
such extreme cases as a government’s efforts to free abducted nationals by 
negotiating with NSAGs. 
Apart from classical diplomatic rules of conduct, however, foreign policy 
has always expected external actors engaging with NSAGs to conform to a 
Box 4:  Engagement is active and passive communication 
In communication studies engagement is defined as reciprocal behaviour be-
tween human beings (or groups of human beings) by which they relate to, are 
guided by and complement and so influence and control each other. Engage-
ment evolves over a range of different forms of expression. It is effected by 
means of language, gestures and symbolism and includes not only such active 
forms of communication as informing, consulting and cooperating but also 
passive communication, which is characterized by the absence of any exchange 
of information. This means such forms of engagement as pure analysis or con-
scious disregard of the engagement partner, which nonetheless betray interre-
lated behaviour and action-guiding attitudes between individuals, societies or 
cultures even though they have no personal contact with one another. 
Source:  Watzlawick (2000) 
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second standard guided by principles of its own reasons of state, whether 
to give expression to its own political interests or certain convictions (in 
the field of human rights, for example). During the Cold War the super-
powers supported numerous rebel movements throughout the world, see-
ing them as ideologically close to themselves or hostile to the rival super-
power. Yet even after the end of the Cold War many such cases can be 
cited: US support for the Kurds of northern Iraq after the first Iraq war in 
1991 and the establishment of the no-fly zone; the recognition by foreign 
states of legitimate concerns of the African National Congress in the South 
Africa of the apartheid years; and generally, the toleration of or failure to 
deport rebel leaders living in exile and sought as terrorists in their own 
countries, possibly extending as far as accommodating (by no means al-
ways peacefully minded) “governments in exile”.  
Such behaviour reflects the fact that the diplomatic customs of interna-
tional relations do not distinguish between types of regime, but that the 
interests of an NSAG are assessed by external actors in their political 
context. It is therefore especially at times of political transformation or 
regime change when external actors often review their attitudes to certain 
NSAGs and even, on occasion, abandon a line of non-engagement hitherto 
considered valid. The same can be said in the context of an ongoing peace 
process. External actors, who are frequently involved in such processes as 
mediators, must of necessity be prepared to engage in constructive talks 
with all parties to a conflict, including NSAGs. As a rule, then, the actors 
chosen to act as mediators are those who do not reject the non-state party 
to the conflict from the outset, since otherwise they can hardly create the 
basis of trust needed if they are to act as “honest brokers”. 
It is true to say, nonetheless, that high barriers almost always have to be 
overcome before there can be direct contact with NSAGs at official dip-
lomatic level. They often consist in the recognition of certain basic princi-
ples of human rights and international law by the groups concerned, their 
commitment to a political project recognized as legitimate and, generally, 
a high degree of international coordination among the external actors. But 
there have also been cases where, for example, OECD countries have 
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supported openly violent NSAGs unilaterally – and, under international 
law, illegally – with a reference to overriding national interests.8 
The United Nations’ recognition of an international responsibility to pro-
tect population groups who do not enjoy (adequate) state protection in 
their own countries has recently given foreign policy fresh scope, legiti-
mized in international law, for engagement with NSAGs. In the final 
document of the Millennium + 5 summit marking the United Nations’ 60th 
anniversary in September 2005, the international community explicitly 
established for the first time the possibility under certain conditions (e.g. a 
Security Council resolution) of intervening with all – including military – 
means where a country is unable or unwilling effectively to protect its 
people against genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against 
humanity (UN 2005, Articles 138–139). As this wording implicitly in-
cludes the protection of population groups against that state, there may 
come a time when the international community allies itself de facto with 
an NSAG against a ruling state power.  
The debate thus refers to the inappropriateness of assessing the options for 
action in relation to an NSAG unless the overall political context, and 
especially the actions of the government concerned, are measured against 
the same standards with which the NSAG is expected to comply. If a gov-
ernment systematically violates human rights, denies certain population 
groups fundamental political participatory rights or opportunities for 
socio-economic development and so itself makes a major contribution to 
the exacerbation of the very conflict in which the NSAG is involved, it 
seems legitimate for external actors to engage more closely with the 
NSAG than when the government’s conduct is generally acceptable in this 
respect. Much the same situation arises where an NSAG performs quasi-
state functions in an area left to its own devices indefinitely by the central 
government concerned because of a lack of interest or capacity or for other 
reasons which are not primarily to do with the NSAG’s existence. 
                                                          
8 A clear example of this is the USA’s support for the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s, 
which contrasted with the Soviet Union’s support for the rebel movements in El Salva-
dor and Guatemala. 
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The etatistic view taken in the past, in which engagement with NSAGs 
was always weighed up against the fundamentally dominant principle of 
sovereignty, may increasingly give way in the international debate to a 
perspective dominated by individual rights and, above all, human rights. In 
peace and conflict research the consequences of this possible shift of em-
phasis are highly controversial well beyond the subject of engagement 
with NSAGs, some critics seeing in it the seed of the dissolution of the 
modern world of states without an operable alternative model to take its 
place.9 
Security policy 
From the security policy perspective NSAGs are seen primarily as a source 
of possible dangers which need to be averted, but which the international 
community is inadequately equipped to avert. The main argument in the 
debate on the “new wars” is that, as NSAGs are not under the control of 
state authority, they also evade the traditional sanction mechanisms of the 
international community. The possible threats may be both direct and 
indirect. Since 2001 greater emphasis has been placed on direct threats 
under the heading of “international terrorism”. The focus here is on armed 
groups whose political agenda extends beyond the borders of an individual 
state or whose retreat is situated in a third country that is either favourably 
disposed towards the NSAG’s activities or helpless to stop them. Indirect 
threats due to the existence of NSAGs are seen to be, in particular, the 
cross-frontier trade in illegal goods (drugs, weapons) and the creation of 
living conditions (caused by persistent or sharply escalating violent con-
flicts) which turn people into refugees from poverty or war.10 
                                                          
9 For a critical view see Horn / Krämer (2004). The rigorous debate was triggered by the 
report “The Responsibility to Protect” published in 2001 by the International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). The recommendations it 
makes form the basis of the section of the final document of the UN General Assembly 
of September 2005 on the protection obligation. 
10 The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identifies six 
types of threat to international security (UN 2004, 23), several of which are linked to the 
existence of NSAGs: (1) “economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious 
disease and environmental degradation”, (2) “inter-state conflict”, (3) “internal con-
flict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities”, (4) “nuclear, ra-
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Like the foreign policy perspective, the security policy view of NSAGs is 
traditionally guided by the primacy of the state’s monopoly of power. 
Many activities of external actors in this sphere directly concern the rein-
forcement or restoration of that monopoly. They include, for example, 
measures to strengthen domestic police authorities, border police or regu-
lar troops (military assistance), but also the secondment of personnel for 
direct operational duties, even extending as far as those prominent cases in 
which international units take over the whole security architecture and 
engage in military action against NSAGs, as in Afghanistan, Kosovo and 
Iraq.  
From the security policy standpoint, however, there may also be construc-
tive engagement with NSAGs, geared less to defence than to integration. 
This is the case, for example, where state structures have completely col-
lapsed and the restoration of state authority can succeed only through the 
integration of informal (often traditional) structures of authority, even if in 
the past they have contributed to the collapse of statehood as NSAGs. 
Cooperation of this kind usually forms part of extensive international 
stabilization efforts and is therefore entrenched in a debate covering all 
areas of policy. 
In the past, however, there have also been cases of an external actor sup-
porting an NSAG against an internationally recognized government for 
security policy motives. Such cases, in which certain armed groups (e.g. 
the Contras in Nicaragua and the Kosovo Liberation Army – Ushtria 
Çlirimtare e Kosovës – UCK) have received direct or indirect military 
assistance (especially supplies of weapons) from OECD countries for their 
struggle against the ruling regime, were, insofar as they became known, 
for the most part extremely controversial politically and hardly complied 
with international law. Against the background of the current debate on 
states accused of promoting “international terrorism” and the simultaneous 
                                                                                                                         
diological, chemical and biological weapons”, (5) “terrorism” and (6) “transnational 
organized crime”. The five main threats to which the European Security Strategy (EU 
2003) refers are similarly closely connected with NSAGs: (1) terrorism, (2) the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, (3) regional conflicts, (4) the failure of states and (5) 
organized crime. 
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efforts to reach international agreements to control small arms, their le-
gitimation is likely to become increasingly difficult. 
Development policy 
A determined development policy perspective of engagement with NSAGs 
is still in its infancy. In much the same way as the formation of newly 
emerging “development policy/ military interfaces” (Klingebiel / Roehder 
2004b; Klingebiel 2006), the question of engagement with NSAGs is still 
conceptual virgin territory for development policy. However, it is possible 
to identify a number of elements which, taken together, reveal the essential 
features of a development policy perspective. 
It must first be remembered that development policy – like any govern-
ment action – is bound by the principle of sovereignty in international 
relations and by the primacy of the state monopoly of power. However, 
development policy is – as described above – involved in a context that 
embraces all policies, which, in the practice of foreign and security policy, 
has always been characterized by flexibility or choice between conflicting 
rights and has recently been undergoing a dynamic change. In the debate 
on the importance of human security as a model for international engage-
ment, development policy in particular is playing a leading role. For de-
velopment policy, then, orientation towards the state partner is subject to a 
qualification relating to the action of the government concerned. 
In addition, development policy has a wider range of instruments of local 
presence than classical foreign or security policy, which means that it is 
affected in more varied ways by the existence and action of NSAGs, but, 
in return for that, enjoys more room for manoeuvre. If features that distin-
guish development policy from other policies and influence engagement 
with NSAGs structurally are sought, reference can be made to three fun-
damental characteristics: 
1. Development policy is confronted with NSAGs in a number of situ-
ational contexts and has to cope with correspondingly complex inter-
actions. In simplified terms, a distinction can be drawn between four 
contexts of relevance to development policy, each subject to its own 
action logic. NSAGs become relevant to development policy: 
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• first, when an attempt has to be made to gain access to target 
groups even where they are threatened or even controlled by 
NSAGs;  
• second, when it is a question of directly guaranteeing the safety 
and protection of development personnel against violence;  
• third, when NSAGs are to be persuaded to submit to international 
rules and standards (relating in particular to human rights law 
and international humanitarian law); 
• and fourth, when a contribution needs to be made to civil conflict 
transformation in the context of a peace process through meas-
ures specifically designed for the purpose.  
Even though each of these situational contexts applies equally to ac-
tors in other areas of policy, they do not apply to all at the same time. 
The safety of personnel (2) in particular is a matter of concern for all 
policies, but the problem of access to target groups (1) extends be-
yond development cooperation mainly to the area of humanitarian as-
sistance, and to the extent that contributions to conflict transformation 
(4) can be ascribed to policies, they are made not only in the context 
of development cooperation but also at the classical level of foreign 
policy’s track-one diplomacy. The various situational contexts need 
to be borne in mind particularly because certain modes of behaviour 
in one context may have implications for the other contexts. A secu-
rity strategy geared to complete isolation, for example, may have an 
adverse effect on a mediator’s credibility in a peace process, just as 
certain strategies designed to ensure access to target groups may have 
consequences for the safety of personnel.11 
2. Development policy has not only the instruments of (bi- and multilat-
eral) governmental development cooperation but also the option of 
supporting non-governmental cooperation. Non-governmental or-
ganizations involved in development cooperation are less subject to 
the rationalities of general foreign policy and thus of international 
relations than government development cooperation and, as a result, 
are often able to exploit their greater independence to engage more 
                                                          
11 The four situational contexts and the resulting goals for engagement with NSAGs are 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4.2. 
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often able to exploit their greater independence to engage more flexi-
bly with NSAGs. Although they too are bound by the domestic laws 
of the partner country concerned, which may penalize contact with 
NSAGs, they are freer to pursue their respective political preferences 
than external governmental actors and, in some cases, their actions 
are governed by a generally recognized supranational ethos (as is true 
of the Churches, for example), which gives them some room for ma-
noeuvre.12 Development policy can use this variety of actors to adopt 
a coordinated, multidimensional approach. 
3. Development policy has to do with a wider range of target groups and 
implementation partners than other externally oriented policies. As a 
general rule, not only non-governmental development cooperation but 
also official bi- and multilateral development policy pursue, despite 
their state orientation in the agreement of measures, a target agenda 
that extends beyond the partner country’s governmental institutions 
into its society. From this it follows that, for development cooperation 
in many countries, the question of engaging with NSAGs has not only 
a tactical dimension (Is my conduct beneficial to my development ob-
jective? Is it harmful to my relations with the partner government?) 
but also direct consequences for the development policy strategy (Is 
the implementation of measures permitted in an area controlled by 
NSAGs? If a planned programme is to be relevant, can it be imple-
mented without contact with NSAGs? What distribution effects will 
my intervention have on various population groups, some associated 
with the state, others with NSAGs?). For coping in conflict situations, 
general development cooperation principles suggest in this context 
modes of behaviour towards NSAGs that differ from a pure strategy 
of exclusion (see Box 5). Instead, development cooperation should 
usually endeavour  
• to avoid bias in the support provided (normally for the govern-
ment side) so as not unwittingly to help exacerbate the conflict; 
• to work towards the inclusion of NSAGs’ constituencies in the 
population rather than their exclusion; 
                                                          
12 However, in the case of foreign (and, to some extent, domestic) civil society organiza-
tions, this “room for manoeuvre” is usually associated with a less secure legal status 
than that enjoyed by governmental development cooperation organizations (see Goe-
deking 2004). 
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Box 5: The DAC Guidelines “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict” 
The recommendations agreed in 2001 by the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee on the prevention of violent conflicts essentially concern the adop-
tion of action principles aimed at making development cooperation generally 
more conflict-sensitive (“do no harm”) and more effective in its efforts to 
contribute to conflict prevention. As in the international debate as a whole at 
the present time, NSAGs do not play a central role in the document. What ref-
erences there are, which typically speak of “rebels” and concern the coordina-
tion of humanitarian assistance, the reintegration of former fighters, child sol-
diers and confidence-building between warring factions, are largely to be found 
in illustrative practical examples, whereas the main text itself makes hardly any 
direct mention of the subject. 
Nonetheless, some important conclusions for engagement with NSAGs can be 
drawn from the principles laid down for a sensitive approach in the context of 
violent conflicts. Particularly relevant are the following statements: 
• “All aid becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political re-
sults. The first principle for aid policy makers is to do no harm and to 
guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts.” (23) 
• “Who gets, or does not get, which share of benefits can be as important as 
the total benefits generated.” (24) 
• “Encouraging and sustaining broad and inclusive dialogue – with demon-
strated followthrough – is critical. It is one way that development co-
operation and other external partners can address different interests and 
perceptions of contending groups in a conflict […]” (24) 
• “Dilemmas arise about how representative certain groups actually are, 
what risks are involved in deciding who and how to consult […]. External 
partners can be facilitators, for example by providing acceptable space and 
platforms for dialogue.” (24) 
• “Long-term engagement can be misinterpreted and carries risks with it. For 
example, continued engagement could appear to be tacit endorsement of 
unacceptable practices, even where it is intended as an attempt to mitigate 
or stop them. […] But such risks are worth running in some cases. External 
actors must be clear, including with their own publics, about their assess-
ments, concerns and goals.” (27) 
• “[…] there is growing recognition of the need for greater and better syn-
chronised coherence between the actions of different ministries in OECD 
countries, other foreign policy actors and international institutions. […] 
The growing movement toward improved co-ordination in development co-
operation in general needs to be re-doubled in conflict situations […]” (28) 
Source:  OECD/DAC (2001) 
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• to stay engaged even in difficult circumstances, if the security si-
tuation permits;13 
• to seek dialogue with NSAG representatives when it comes to 
gauging opportunities and routes, but also obstacles, to a peace 
process. 
2.5 NSAGs’ views of development policy 
It can be conjectured that, as a rule, an NSAG’s engagement in relation to 
development policy similarly pursues more or less clearly defined goals or 
rationalities of action. At least those NSAGs which have quasi-state fea-
tures (territorial control and the like) often have effective mechanisms for 
influencing or even guiding forms and intensity of engagement. Provided 
that an NSAG is a group that is acting strategically – not one that is scat-
tered and proceeding without any kind of plan – cost-benefit considera-
tions will presumably determine its attitude to development policy and 
equally to other external actors. 
“Costs”, from an NSAG’s viewpoint, are like to arise particularly as a 
result of greater international transparency and information gathering for 
external actors. This greater density of information will, in an NSAG’s 
opinion, directly or indirectly benefit the government of the country con-
cerned politically or militarily. The information may concern an NSAG’s 
political, administrative, financial and military abilities and capacities. 
There may also be a risk of such issues as the recruitment of child soldiers 
and the use of outlawed weapons being broached more. International po-
litical and public perception and opinion-forming may then change to an 
NSAG’s detriment. Such information may have direct repercussions for an 
NSAG’s options for taking action. This is true, for example, when it is to 
be decided whether an NSAG is to be listed as a terrorist group or whether 
                                                          
13 Within the DAC in particular the principle of staying engaged wherever possible, even 
in adverse circumstances, emerged during the “Learning and Advisory Process on Dif-
ficult Partnerships” (now renamed: “Fragile States Group”) as one of the main princi-
ples governing behaviour. See OECD/DAC (2005a, 2005b). 
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its activities in third countries should be restricted (“collecting donations” 
in the diaspora community concerned, etc.). 
“Benefits”, from an NSAG’s viewpoint, may exist in various respects. 
Direct engagement may be construed as enhancing an NSAG’s political 
status and used by it to this end. This is true at international level, but also 
with respect to the balance of political power in the country concerned. 
Any “international recognition” of NSAGs as interlocutors is likely to be 
highly significant for many groups. If actual aid is associated with devel-
opment cooperation or humanitarian assistance, it too is likely to play an 
important role from the NSAG standpoint, since additional resources will 
then be available in the areas they control. These resources (materials, 
vehicles, fuel, etc.) may end up in the hands of the NSAG and so be of 
direct help in reinforcing its capacities. As NSAGs see it, international 
personnel too can possibly be used as targets of potential threats and extor-
tion. Better living conditions for target groups under an NSAG’s control 
may similarly be in its interests. Its own legitimacy and political support 
may be increased in this way. 
2.6 Challenges for development policy posed by 
engagement with NSAGs 
Engaging with NSAGs thus poses a number of policy-specific challenges 
for development policy. It can take on these challenges, however, only if it 
is aware of the perspectives of other policies. This seems necessary not 
only to ensure a coherent external policy as a whole, but especially be-
cause the lines separating the various policies (primarily development and 
security policy) are proving to be increasingly porous. It has long been 
possible to identify a number of interfaces:  
• military actors are concerned with operational aspects of civil recon-
struction; 
• development cooperation is seeking reforms in the security sector; 
• the use of official development assistance (ODA) for military peace 
missions is under discussion;  
• official peace negotiations involving senior diplomatic mediators are 
backed by confidence-building measures at track-two and track-three 
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diplomatic level, with the active participation of development coop-
eration actors.  
The lines separating policies differ according to whether the distinction is 
based on actors and institutions, resources or target agendas. As policies 
are in practice determined by the sum of all these factors, a growing area 
of overlap arises. This conforms in every way to the logic of a modern 
image of development which places the emphasis on the actors and re-
sources needed to solve a complex problem and, in the analysis of re-
quirements, does not halt at the classical institutional frontiers of the vari-
ous policies. Development policy today refuses to be reduced to develop-
ment cooperation aimed rigidly at target groups, nor is an enlightened 
foreign and security policy restricted to a set of reactive diplomatic and 
military instruments. From the development policy perspective in particu-
lar, there is a growing call for an integrative understanding of foreign 
policy that is oriented towards an “enlarged security concept” and a con-
cept of development geared to “human security”.  
Adopting a development policy position on engagement with NSAGs 
should thus be one of the first steps towards a coordinated, all-policy per-
spective, which should, however, leave room for differentiation to cater 
for policy-specific requirements.  
In the light of the considerations and standards presented here from the 
international sphere and from the viewpoints of various government de-
partments, general requirements to be satisfied by the engagement of de-
velopment actors with NSAGs can be summarized as follows: 
• Any engagement with NSAGs should take a highly conflict-sensitive 
form and be situationally appropriate; this must also entail the con-
scious adoption of a position on violence committed by the state con-
cerned.  
• In particular, the principle of “doing no harm” must be observed. 
• Engagement with NSAGs should not be an end in itself but a means 
to an important, clearly identifiable end. 
• The form of engagement should be legally defensible (against the 
background inter alia of constantly evolving international criminal 
law). 
Development cooperation and non-state armed groups 
German Development Institute  45
• It must also form part of an overall foreign policy strategy that com-
mits all external policy actors (especially in the areas of foreign, secu-
rity and development policy) to a coordinated and coherent approach. 
• Finally, it should be ethically defensible in the sense that the decision 
whether certain forms of engagement are acceptable is guided by 
principles that can be generalized. 
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3 Patterns of non-state armed group engagement  
If it is to be possible to develop options for external actors when they 
engage with NSAGs, it is important to identify their recurrent behavioural 
patterns. This concerns not least their reliability in honouring agreements 
with external actors. Although it is impossible to identify patterns of en-
gagement true of all types of NSAG, their behaviour is characterized by 
certain factors. The environment in which they move plays an important 
role in stamping certain characteristics, such as ideology, motivation, 
organizational structure, revenue base, networking, strategies and tactics. 
This chapter analyses the range of patterns of NSAG engagement by refer-
ence to these characteristics and from this draws conclusions that permit a 
better assessment of how reliable NSAGs are when engaging with external 
actors. The state’s influence on the environment in which NSAGs and 
external actors take action is also examined in this context with a view to 
revealing the often undefined positions of the actors involved in the con-
flict and the effects they have on development cooperation. 
Environment of NSAG action 
As a general rule, the environment in which NSAGs take action differs 
fundamentally from established democratic systems. It is precisely this 
environment that determines strategies and tactics, organizational struc-
tures and the quite specific nature of the NSAG. In most cases, for exam-
ple, NSAGs emerge in countries in which the state monopoly of power is 
in crisis (fragile states).14 The danger posed by the absence of an effective 
state monopoly of power is that it may lead to persistent civil war (see 
Jackson 1990; von Trotha 2000; Waldmann 2002). The factors that may 
plunge the state monopoly of power into a sustained crisis and so create 
favourable conditions for NSAGs can often be analytically subdivided into 
process and structure factors (see, for example, Schneckener 2004, 18).15 
                                                          
14 Fragile states are characterized primarily by a decline in the performance of the core 
state function as defined by Max Weber, i.e. ensuring the safety of citizens by means of 
a secure monopoly on legitimate force (Weber 1922/1980). 
15 The third category typically added consists of trigger factors. Trigger factors are events 
that can trigger an abrupt change within a few days or weeks, such as military interven-
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These factors define the environment in which NSAGs take action and so 
provide pointers to the different degrees to which various characteristics 
are present within the group (see Table 2). Thus the influence of other 
states, the politicization of ethnic differences in a multiethnic population 
structure or local inequalities may influence the group’s ideology, motiva-
tion, organization and social and financial base (see Weinstein 2004).16 
Both categories of factors thus play a part in the systematization of behav-
ioural characteristics inasmuch as they help to explain why an NSAG is 
inclined to take certain actions and adopt certain attitudes in a given envi-
ronment. 
Structure factors 
Structure factors are relatively sustained economic, ecological and politi-
cal circumstances that evade short-term changes. They are often the root 
causes of violent conflicts. They frequently structure a conflict in phases, 
in which the central state power is still strong enough not to collapse com-
pletely, but already too weak to defeat its opponents (Bouchez 2004, 7). 
Structure factors are also in evidence when, for example, structures “inher-
ited” from the past are meant to act as the base for a new kind of state 
(Scott 1998).17 Thus a conflict between a central government and an 
NSAG may be due to a century or more of relations between different 
ethnic groups, such as herdsmen, nomads and arable farmers, which in the 
course of time have become politically charged as conflicts over resources 
(Hübner-Schmid 2004). The legitimacy of NSAGs’ current action by no 
                                                                                                                         
tions from outside and rapid changes in power politics. As, then, NSAGs or their behav-
iour may themselves be factors triggering an acute crisis in the monopoly of power, 
structure and process factors are mainly relevant to the analysis of NSAGs’ long-term 
behavioural patterns. 
16 Weinstein comes to the conclusion that, where the group is in a good economic position, 
i.e. natural and financial resources are available, it has difficulty in recruiting members 
who remain committed in the long term. In environments where resources are limited, 
on the other hand, social ties lead to a high recruitment rate and members who remain 
committed in the long term. 
17 In the post-colonial period in particular, some of the development strategies pursued 
sought to centralize power in the newly independent states and to reduce the local 
autonomy of customs and practices (“authoritarian high modernism”), which often 
caused conflict between central governments and local authorities. 
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means always stems from the interests of the people, as the present chapter 
will show, but is often led by other motives and aspects, some of which 
lack transparency. 
Table 2:  Factors conducive to fragile statehood 
Structure factors Process factors 
International / regional level 
• Degree of integration into the world 
economy 
• Instability of the region/ fragile 
states in the regional environment 
• Influence of other states (super-
power, former colonial power or 
regional power) 
• Civil wars in the regional environ-
ment 
• Activities of transnational power 
networks 
• Economic crises in neighbouring 
states 
• Ecological degradation of the re-
gion 
National level 
• “Inherited” structures (e.g. colonial, 
pre-colonial or imperial structures) 
• Multiethnic population structure 
• Demographic factors (birth rate, 
child mortality, proportion of young 
people) 
• Scarcity or structural unequal dis-
tribution of resources 
• Crisis-prone rent economy 
• Influence of traditional forms of 
rule (clan structure, role of chiefs, 
patriarchal structures) 
• Experience gained in previous con-
flicts 
• Rapid decline in living standards 
• Political instrumentalization of 
social discontent 
• Politicization of ethnic differences 
• Growth of political extremism (in-
cluding repression) 
• Suppression of or discrimination 
against certain groups 
• Growth of corruption and clientel-
ism 
• Privatization of power 
• Failed or stagnant democratization 
• Increase in ecological problems 
(e.g. water shortages) 
Substate level 
• Centre-periphery differences  
(e.g. flight from the land) 
• Local inequalities 
• Regional or local identities 
• Increasing crime in urban areas 
• Increase in local armed groups 
• Ethnic separatism 
• Local struggles for power 
Source:  Schneckener (2004, 19) 
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Process factors 
As a cause of the erosion of statehood, process factors are gaining in sig-
nificance in situations where the central government is unable to assert 
itself against individual interests and in processes on which the central 
government has no direct influence. Civil wars in the regional environ-
ment and the ecological degradation of whole areas are examples of this 
and are often accompanied by the violent suppression of the interests of 
individual sections of the population as the central government attempts to 
maintain its position of power. Accordingly, non-state power is able to 
gain a foothold particularly in processes in which the state is collapsing or 
coming into being, when legitimate state power is no longer or not yet 
consolidated in the interior. 
Any combination of process and structure factors may also exacerbate a 
latent conflict where the state uses a repressive mechanism that prompts a 
group possibly established as a peaceful political opposition to resort to 
force after suffering at the hands of the government, an example being the 
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and various Islamic terrorist groups, which, 
in 1991, justified the armed struggle of their supporters as a necessary 
defence measure against the repressive acts of the Algerian government 
(HIIK 2002). Yet even without direct confrontation with central govern-
ment non-state power may gain a foothold especially in peripheral areas of 
the state territory where it takes over state tasks for various reasons 
(Bouchez 2004, 6). Although most conflict situations involving NSAGs 
are the legal responsibility of the central state administration, the influence 
of the de jure government over the territory of the state is often badly 
affected by the influence of NSAGs. Especially where state instruments of 
power are corruptible or hardly visible (the state monopoly of power is 
frequently confined to the capital), instruments form that exercise author-
ity in what are known as violence-free areas (Schlichte 2000, 162). 
Process and structure factors thus create a separate environment for NSAG 
action, in which various characteristics evolve to different degrees within 
the group. The following analysis of NSAG characteristics will consider 
the various possible degrees of these characteristics within this action 
environment. 
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3.1 Ideology and motivation underlying the formation of 
groups 
NSAGs develop their characteristics in response to the challenges they 
find themselves facing within the environment in which they take action. 
The ideology and motivation underlying the formation of groups are of the 
utmost importance in this context, although they may change in the course 
of a group’s activities or even become secondary (as a result, for example, 
of a shift away from demands for political participation to economic bene-
fits). To illustrate the range of possible motivations, it is useful to make a 
distinction between greed and grievance. 
Greed and grievance 
The implicit or explicit motivations defended by NSAGs – sometimes in 
explicit ideological programmes – may cover a wide range of political and 
economic objectives. It has become the established practice in the litera-
ture to distinguish between greed and grievance as the primary motivation, 
the emphasis in the recent debate tending to be placed on greed-oriented, 
i.e. economic, objectives of NSAGs (see Berdal / Malone 2000; Ballen-
tine / Sherman 2003). 
Since the late 1990s there has been a growing assumption that it is becom-
ing increasingly impossible to define violent conflicts with ideological 
clichés as each takes on its own, individual characteristics (Schlichte / 
Jung / Siegelberg 2003). In such conflicts the political motivation that may 
have prompted the formation of the group may be disregarded and give 
way to what are mainly selfish economic objectives. Such developments 
are usually thought to be due to the economic rationality of the fighters 
and the economic strategies of the elites, which make war seem more 
profitable than peace. Behind this shift from grievance to greed orientation 
often lie the socialization of armed groups, i.e. increased interaction be-
tween armed groups and society, and the protraction of many conflicts 
(Maringer / Steinweg 1997; Simmel 1908/1992). At economic level it has 
often been struggles over resources that have led to the formation of 
groups, for example through the defence of the local source of subsistence 
against the government or other (local) groups, as in the struggle among 
Kenyan and Ugandan ethnic groups for pastureland, cattle and aid sup-
plies. However, many groups now have vaguer goals or communicate 
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them no more than conditionally, as in the case of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. 
Socialization and protraction 
In many areas where statehood is limited, the state and hierarchically or-
ganized NSAGs have lost their “duopoly” on warfare.18 This development 
has reduced any strategic orientation of NSAGs towards traditional war-
fare and the goal of capturing the state apparatus of government and has 
been conducive to detachment from state structures. “Many groups are 
fighting each other to ensure their survival as organizations and access to 
resources without which the continuous use of force will be impossible.” 
(Chojnacki 2005, 77) However, it is a development that is true not only of 
NSAGs, but certainly extends to regular troops, who are becoming less 
civil and less professional as a result of socialization and protraction. Ex-
amples include not only such NSAGs as the Mouvement Patriotique de la 
Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest 
(MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MPJ) in Côte 
d’Ivoire but also such groups as the traditional Senoufo hunters, the 
“Dozo” and gangs of young people like the Young Patriots and the 
Fédération Estudiantine de la Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). A role is similarly 
played by private military companies (PMCs) and private security compa-
nies (PSCs), such as Executive Outcomes, which was engaged by the gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone to restore security in the capital, Freetown, and its 
surroundings (1995/6), and the paramilitary West Side Boys and the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (Mehler 2004, 541–43; Reno 
2004). 
However, this does not necessarily mean that political ideologies and mo-
tivations are disappearing from the environment of an economy of vio-
lence (see Clapham 1998; Reno 1998). Particularly in areas of limited 
statehood network-like informal political practices and new forms of po-
litical authority often emerge, accompanied by processes of extreme poli-
ticization and militarization of ethnic categories (Kaldor 1999, especially 
                                                          
18 The term “limited statehood” is used when state power does not extend over the whole 
of the state territory, parts being under NSAG control, for example. The NSAG and 
government thus effectively “share” the power of state (“duopoly”).  
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Chapter 4). In many cases, then, it would be to misunderstand the group 
and the conflict to consider only the war-economy strategies of an NSAG 
and totally to neglect its political motivations. Indeed, the motivations and 
objectives pursued by NSAGs cover a wide political and economic area: 
politically, many groups merely seek better representation of their ethnic 
roots and indigenous traditions or of their region, while others want auton-
omy or separation from the state, often taking the form of anti-colonial 
liberation movements, as in the case of the Front de Libération Nationale 
(FLN) in Algeria and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Af-
rica (Brown 2002; Stott 2004, 9; see Figure 1).19  
Many groups see themselves as part of a long tradition of national or eth-
nic resistance to oppression (e.g. the Mouvement des forces démocratiques 
de la Casamance, which is fighting for the representation and develop-
ment of the Casamance). As all historical tales include explicit or implicit 
visions of justice, external actors may find in them a starting point for a 
dialogue on respect for human rights in areas controlled by NSAGs 
(ICHRP 1999, 17). The potential for external actors to engage with NSAGs 
                                                          
19 It should be noted in this context that the Westphalian system, which is based on states 
and includes principles of state sovereignty and international law, is recognized in all 
these cases. Thus most NSAGs are not anti-state in the ideological sense, i.e. opposed to 
a state system, but rather opposed to the government in power in their country. 
Figure 1:  Scale of political motivations of NSAGs 
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tends to grow where the NSAG has alternative values and a new vision of 
state and society, as in the case of the opposition in Swaziland in its strug-
gle for a change of political system. 
Yet in the political context too, greed orientation, i.e. greed for power, 
must not be overlooked: although depoliticization does not occur in all 
war-economy conflicts, issues of power and rule may become so important 
for an NSAG that the movement’s potential for transformation is ulti-
mately determined by greed-oriented objectives. An example of this is, in 
many respects, the former conflict between troops of the União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Angolan gov-
ernment (Heberer 2000). 
Whether an NSAG’s organization pivots primarily on political or material 
incentives or on shared identities, however, has major implications for the 
group’s conduct in the conflict and thus for the potential for engagement 
of which external actors can take advantage. If the main interest is in eco-
nomic greed or political power for its own sake, NSAGs’ conduct is often 
characterized by a total disregard for the interests of the civilian popula-
tion and includes pillaging, destruction and indiscriminate violence. On 
the other hand, NSAGs that are characterized by a social vision and recruit 
their members on the basis of broad ideological affinity tend to demon-
strate a greater degree of discipline, engagement for the non-combatant 
population and the more targeted use of force (Stott 2004, 12). 
3.2 Organizational structure 
The organizational structure of an NSAG often reflects its underlying 
motivation. It also has a direct bearing on an NSAG’s reliability when 
engaging with external actors. The organizational structure determines 
whether arrangements made or directives issued by the leadership can be 
enforced throughout the organization. The leadership’s internal control 
over rank and file members is crucial in this context. Internal control takes 
different forms, ranging from social control at one end of the continuum to 
acts of terror against the NSAG’s own members at the other end. The 
factors that determine the degree of internal control include in particular: 
• the manner in which power is exercised, 
• the nature of the rank and file members and 
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• the degree of secrecy. 
Knowledge of an NSAG’s organizational structure is essential for external 
actors wishing to engage with it when, for example, it comes to identifying 
suitable interlocutors. For this it is necessary to know who has the power 
within the group to conclude agreements and to enforce them throughout 
the organization. Although most NSAGs in fact have a fixed organization, 
it must also be remembered that, despite sometimes having a clearly de-
fined leadership and organizational structure, they do not necessarily speak 
with one voice (Stott 2004, 7). Many NSAGs leave room for different 
political, ideological and economic tendencies in their leadership and 
organization. The spectrum thus often ranges from hardliners to reformers, 
from warmongers to peace activists, from fundamentalists to pragmatists. 
Consequently, any differences of opinion within an NSAG leadership have 
considerable significance for external actors’ engagement – and especially 
agreements – with NSAGs. As a rule, engagement is therefore possible 
(and appropriate) only with selected individual NSAG members, but not 
with the group collectively (Tull 2005). 
The leadership’s internal control over rank and file members 
NSAG leaders often choose organizational structures which are either 
highly centralized (e.g. with the complex structures of a shadow govern-
ment and/or a traditional army) or highly decentralized (as in the case of 
warlords), with a large degree of decision-making power held by subordi-
nate or function-specific units. According to the manner in which the lead-
ership exercises power over rank and file members or over the population, 
agreements with external actors very much depend on the organizational 
form. 
Where the leadership’s control over the members is very tight (as in the 
case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE), there are often ad-
mission rituals aimed at distancing new members rapidly from their previ-
ous life and from their family; potential members are frequently forced to 
prove their loyalty by committing acts of violence (ICHRP 1999, 19). For 
external actors a tightly organized NSAG means that it can be relied on 
more to honour agreements, since the leadership is able to ensure that even 
fairly small subgroups honour arrangements that have been agreed (Debiel 
et al. 2005). If the armed group is organized as part of a larger movement 
(such as the Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad, MFUA, in Mali) 
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or if the leadership bases its ideology on intellectual references and on 
unified and clearly defined attitudes, it will usually find opportunistic 
factions within the group difficult to control. It may be possible, for exam-
ple, to engage in dialogue on human rights with any such factions that 
question current violent practices. If, however, the rank and file members 
over which the leadership has command is largely uneducated, ideological 
discrepancies and arbitrary acts may go unnoticed to some extent, and 
instead, blind trust in the acts of the leadership may prevail (ICHRP 1999, 
19). 
Similarly, it is easier for an NSAG leadership to control opportunistic 
opinions and views within its group if it operates in great secrecy. As 
exchanges among the subunits acting in secrecy remain limited, informa-
tion on oppression within the organization spreads less quickly. As a 
means of controlling opportunistic opinions from the outset and promoting 
the cohesion of the group, internal terrorism is endorsed by some NSAGs. 
This may occur on such a scale that organized secret services have infil-
trated the whole NSAG system for observation purposes, as in the case of 
the Force Libanaise in Lebanon (ICHRP 1999, 20). In addition, serious 
dangers facing members when undertaking operations may encourage 
some “tolerance of intolerance” in relation to group ideology and motiva-
tion, i.e. increase internal coherence and social pressure among the mem-
bers of the group. Where an NSAG develops a tradition of intolerance, it 
will be as difficult for external actors to gain access to it as it will be for 
opportunistic opinions to form within the group (ICHRP 1999, 19). 
Far more difficult for the leadership of an NSAG to control, on the other 
hand, are fighters who have joined the group because of the prospect of 
short-term material rewards, as is true of mercenaries, for example. Orders 
or instructions from an NSAG’s command centre will often guide the 
actions of such fighters and units formed by them only as long as they 
remain consistent with their specific interest in enriching themselves. 
Consequently, greed-oriented subunits of an NSAG are not entirely reli-
able partners when it comes to honouring agreements (Weinstein 2004). 
System of social control 
Another kind of control exercised by the leadership of an NSAG over its 
members is more of a social nature and may also include the population. 
Seen from the angle of such systems of social control, NSAGs should not 
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be regarded as actors detached from society, but as groups whose societal 
contexts limit their options for action and impose certain duties on them by 
creating a socio-psychological sense of unity, solidarity and collectivity 
(see Ballentine / Sherman 2003). This makes it possible to determine 
which violent practices and objectives of the use of force are supported by 
the members of the group and the population and which are regarded as 
illegitimate. Although there are often clear arrangements for a project to be 
visited in an area under NSAG control, such visits are not always without 
their dangers. Abductions on economic grounds (greed) may occur despite 
agreements. In March 2003, for example, a representative of the Church 
Development Service (EED) was detained by the Kuki Liberation Army 
(KLA) when visiting a project in the Imphal district of the state of Ma-
nipur in north-eastern India and taken to an unknown place, even though 
the commander responsible had been informed of the visit. The EED’s 
local partner organization then launched a massive campaign in the local 
media, in which the population were told of the disastrous effects the ab-
duction would have on the support which foreign partners were providing 
for the area controlled by the rebels. It did not take long for the abduction 
to be brought to a peaceful end without any money changing hands (EMD 
2003). 
3.2.1 Leadership 
For their operations, many armed groups adopt a military structure with 
forms of military discipline and a leadership whose authority is under-
scored by senior military ranks. The leadership of an NSAG of this kind 
may be strictly hierarchical in its organization, or it may take the form of a 
network coordinating relatively autonomous regional or functional sub-
units. In other cases, NSAGs have structures more typical of political 
organizations, possibly due to the motives originally underlying the forma-
tion of the group, e.g. as a non-violent political opposition party (ICHRP 
1999, 18).  
In both types of NSAG leadership may be authoritarian and in the hands of 
a single individual or a small cadre. On the other hand, there are NSAGs 
whose leadership is accountable to the rank and file members and forms 
part of internal democratic structures. The LTTE in Sri Lanka, for exam-
ple, which is effectively led by a single person with a cult-like status (Ve-
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lupillai Prabhakaran), should be compared with the military wing of the 
ANC in South Africa (Umkhonto We Sizwe, MK), which was under the 
political control of the ANC and had internal mechanisms of accountabil-
ity (ICHRP 1999, 18). 
Some armed groups are led by professional soldiers, intellectuals or politi-
cians with many years of experience in government, others by young offi-
cers, students or peasants. The level of education attained by the leader-
ship is no indication of its moral qualities. Pol Pot, for instance, “Brother 
No 1” of the Khmer Rouge until 1997, was a graduate of the Sorbonne. 
Klaus Schlichte has pointed out that formal western upbringing and educa-
tion is a conspicuously frequent feature among NSAG leaders (Schlichte 
2000). Although no obvious conclusions on the nature of an NSAG can, in 
principle, be drawn from the level of education reached by its leaders, 
those with a poor education and little experience of government activities 
have tended to demonstrate less comprehensible decision-making proc-
esses. They are less aware, for example, of legal procedures or prevailing 
diplomatic rules of conduct and so fail to comply with them (Schlichte 
2000). However, NSAG leaders whose poor formal education means that 
they have limited knowledge of strategic warfare and diplomacy often 
appoint “bookmen”, who have an appropriate formal upbringing and edu-
cation and serve the NSAG leadership as advisers. 
Where an NSAG is led by a single individual, his personal social, eco-
nomic and political background usually plays a decisive part in determin-
ing the ideology, motivation and activities of the group. The group’s basic 
convictions and conduct will vary depending on whether the leader is 
driven by certain political beliefs, by a quest for economic advantages or 
by the goal of gaining power. The way in which a leader has risen to his 
present position is also important for his moral authority and legitimacy as 
leader of the group (Schetter 2004b, 28). 
3.2.2 Social base 
NSAGs are linked to a social base outside the circle of their own members 
in very different ways. In some cases, the moral and political support 
given by certain population groups (constituencies) is a major source of 
legitimacy; in others, proper protective alliances exist between local popu-
lation groups and NSAGs; in yet others, local population groups are forced 
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against their will and under the threat of violence to give an NSAG sup-
port. When it comes not only to mobilizing support but also to using force, 
NSAGs often encounter special environmental conditions in refugee 
camps and in the diaspora. 
The population in general may have reason to see armed groups as legiti-
mate both because of the goal they are pursuing and because the popula-
tion identifies with the NSAG fighters. The legitimacy of the group in the 
eyes of the population particularly depends on whether its proclaimed 
objective is felt to be just and how direct the threat and oppression at the 
hands of a common adversary are deemed to be. If the people see normal 
political activity as an alternative to the open struggle against oppression, 
it is doubtful they will support NSAGs’ activities voluntarily. If, on the 
other hand, a population group identifies with an NSAG’s members and 
sees them as representing their interests, the NSAG has an important 
source of legitimacy (ICHRP 1999, 24). Even in cases where the civilian 
population does not necessarily support the activities of an NSAG, some 
solidarity with the fighters may emerge and find expression in protection 
against government troops or the gift of foodstuffs (ICHRP 1999, 25).20  
Where a country is in a situation of seriously eroding or eroded statehood, 
characterized by pillage, seizures or other, even more radical forms of 
arbitrary violence against the civilian population, and if this violence ema-
nates from the official government or third parties (other NSAGs), the 
population groups affected may be prompted by such extreme experience 
to entrust their protection – and therefore the logic of their action in many 
cases – to an NSAG (ICHRP 1999, 23). The development of a new self-
image is also to be observed among NSAGs that see themselves as the 
guarantors of the safety of a given local unit (clan, ethnic group, local 
community) and of its property (see Mehler 2004).21 In certain cultural 
contexts, the protection of women, to which tremendous importance is 
attached as an expression of male honour in patriarchically oriented com-
                                                          
20 In some conflicts the civilian followers of an armed group often refer to the fighters as 
“the boys” in this context. 
21 Mehler describes the ambivalence between security and the use of force that occurs 
when the provider of security is also a violent actor and so generates insecurity that he 
simultaneously offsets by providing security services. 
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munities, serves as the main argument for the existence of militias – and 
also as a means of controlling the population (Schetter 2004b, 27; see also 
Roy 1986, 173; Schetter 2004a). 
In many such cases the line between protection and coercion is no longer 
clearly identifiable. In extreme cases, NSAGs, boasting ideological justifi-
cations, will purposefully use force against the civilian population to ob-
tain material, medical or other support, constantly threatening further acts 
of violence. The relationship between the NSAG and the population may 
both shift with the passage of time from one end of the continuum to the 
other and, at the same time, be viewed differently by different sections of 
the local population. 
Particular opportunities arise for NSAGs in the context of refugee camps 
and other communities of internally displaced persons (IDPs). NSAGs 
often gain access to these psychologically fragile environments to mobi-
lize support, but they are also responsible in many cases for press-ganging 
and for various forms of material and sexual exploitation. 
For NSAGs that have dedicated themselves to representing the interests of 
a given population group, diaspora communities also represent an impor-
tant source of support. In many cases, communities of displaced persons 
living “in exile” identify closely with the NSAG fighters at home. Some 
diaspora communities have large sums of money and other resources with 
which NSAGs can be supplied. Occasionally, they form an important 
reserve for the recruitment of new fighters. However, it is not uncommon 
for diaspora communities to be coerced into providing support rather than 
giving it voluntarily (Pérouse de Montclos 2005, 43). 
3.3 The role of the state 
The nature of the state in relation to which an NSAG defines its aims and 
means naturally has a major influence on the group’s conduct and pattern 
of engagement. In most cases, the NSAG’s environment is characterized 
by erosion of effective statehood, to whose progress government actors 
have themselves often contributed. Frequently, at least some sections of 
the population question the legitimacy of the ruling regime, since the abil-
ity and willingness of government institutions to provide services for the 
public is sometimes subject to serious restrictions, and it is not unusual for 
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government actors to be responsible for massive human rights violations 
(see also Box 6). All these factors, accompanied by the nature of state 
authorities’ engagement with opposition actors, including armed groups, 
largely determine an NSAG’s room for manoeuvre and its opportunities to 
mobilize support in and outside the country and so leave their mark on the 
nature of the NSAG.  
Where statehood is weak and state legitimacy rests on weak foundations, 
two ideal-type scenarios can be described:  
1. On the one hand, the official government and the NSAG practically 
compete with one another to be considered legitimate by the people 
and to be recognized internationally.22 If external actors cast doubt on 
                                                          
22 Of importance in some such situations is that even the introduction to the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights implicitly considers the removal of illegitimate gov-
ernment by force of arms to be possible, stating: “it is essential, if man is not to be com-
 
Box 6: Causes of the erosion of state legitimacy 
From empirical studies it is possible to derive five situations in which a state or 
government appears to the population to be illegitimate and the population may 
give its support to an NSAG: 
• The state is regarded as an illegitimate colonial or occupying power. 
• The state is deemed to be repressive, since it suppresses political freedoms 
or resorts to the economic exploitation of the people (by levying taxes or 
collecting money without justification). 
• The state proves to be incompetent (because of widespread corruption, poor 
economic policy, etc.). 
• The legitimacy of the state is questioned because of ideological differences 
or the absence of representation (ethnic, regional). 
• State legitimacy may be questionable where the national government leaders 
are considered legitimate, but local government representatives are regarded 
as illegitimate. 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation 
Development cooperation and non-state armed groups 
German Development Institute  61
a state’s claim to rule over a territory and it is felt that the struggle for 
the territory cannot be won by the government, NSAGs may some-
times be regarded as the de facto government(s) (Somaliland). In an 
extreme case, a government may have to abandon its claim to be the 
legitimate representative of the people entirely, and the NSAG (or a 
representative body dominated by it) will take over this role (as, at 
times, during the Eritrean struggle for freedom). A government may 
lose legitimacy if it begins to lose the fight with an NSAG militarily 
or if the measures it takes against an armed group are regarded do-
mestically or even internationally as oppressive or disproportionately 
violent. The strategy adopted by some armed groups therefore con-
sists in provoking military reprisals by the official government 
against the people in order to reduce its legitimacy (Laqueur 2004). 
2. In a second scenario the state (the ruling regime) forms an alliance 
with certain NSAGs, rewarding them for an assurance of general loy-
alty, for example, with government posts, which in fact enable them 
to determine certain areas of policy as they see fit, but in the guise of 
state authority (Tajikistan). Another kind of “reward” may consist in 
direct material allocations to the group. This scenario presupposes 
that the dispute between the government and the NSAG does not 
primarily concern indivisible goods (e.g. sovereignty over a territory), 
but appears to the two parties to permit co-existence within the one 
state, the main issue being “appropriate” participation. The difficulty 
for external actors in these circumstances lies in recognizing that they 
frequently have to deal with actors who, though seemingly represent-
ing state authority, are in fact not (or not entirely) subject to control 
exercised by a state monopoly of power. 
Ian Spears (2004, 15) makes a distinction between three categories of 
states in which NSAGs play a particularly important role: 
• quasi-states (e.g. Somaliland), 
• shadow states (e.g. Guinea, Kosovo) and 
• failing states (e.g. Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia). 
                                                                                                                         
pelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” 
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Quasi-states are characterized by weak administrative structures and often 
by a multiethnic population structure. In shadow states de jure sovereignty 
usually conceals the personal rule of a state elite, who are less interested in 
forming the state or in its inhabitants’ well-being than in their personal 
gain. In a failing state, a phenomenon that has been under particularly 
intensive discussion since the 1990s, a government not only fails to meet 
the population’s basic needs but is also increasingly incapable of perform-
ing its functions, in the security as in other sectors, or has completely 
ceased to function. All these situations offer NSAGs favourable opportuni-
ties for taking action and for strengthening their position – even for oust-
ing official state actors.  
3.4 Revenue base 
How an NSAG comes by the money and other resources it needs to 
achieve its objectives is a question that is relevant in various respects. In 
some cases, the nature of its revenue base will indicate how reliable and 
legitimate the NSAG is regarded by the people. In recent conflict research 
three types of economy in particular have been discussed in the context of 
violent conflict (Goodhand 2004): 
• economies of violence 
• shadow economies  
• war economies  
An economy of violence is defined as a circulatory flow intended primarily 
to finance war efforts and to achieve military objectives. Key actors in an 
economy of violence are commanders, fighters and suppliers of arms and 
materials. The means employed by economies of violence are the taxation 
of lawful and unlawful economic activities and the provision of money, 
arms, equipment and mercenaries for NSAGs (through diaspora networks, 
for example), economic blockades of opposition areas, liquidation of as-
sets, pillaging and the manipulation of aid supplies. The key actors in an 
economy of violence often have no overriding interest in restoring peace, 
since it may lead to a loss of power, status and revenue. Fighters, on the 
other hand, are frequently interested in peace where there are alternative 
income opportunities (see Elwert 1999; Schetter 2004b). 
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The concept of the shadow economy emphasizes the illegality of certain 
forms of economic activity and presupposes a normative division into 
legal and illegal economies, which is, however, often inconsistent with 
what the society affected thinks (see Fleming / Roman / Farrell 2000; 
Goodhand 2004). The main aim of actors in a shadow economy is to gain 
or retain the power that is nurtured by social status, recognition by the 
community and legitimacy. Economic resources are needed to develop a 
clientele system and to manipulate political decisions (Schetter 2004b, 31). 
The key actors in a shadow economy are interested primarily in profit. 
They often include parts of the transport sector, businessmen, drug dealers 
and such “downstream actors” as truck drivers and poppy farmers. 
Shadow economies engaged in violent conflicts often feature mafia struc-
tures, gangs of organized criminals or, generally, actors who exercised 
control over shadow sectors of the economy even before the war to finance 
an armed rebellion, for instance (cf. the Revolutionary United Front / RUF 
in Sierra Leone and the Kosovo Liberation Army / KLA). For making 
profits on the fringes of a conflict, peace may be of interest to key actors if 
it encourages long-term investment and lawful entrepreneurial activity (see 
Sedra 2002; Glatzer 2003, 35).23 
The war economy, finally, is an economy that has assumed a specific form 
because of a state of war, but is also sustained by it and itself forms a bar-
rier to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; this is true, for example, of the 
illegal sales of coltan or the growing of coca plants and poppies (Schetter 
2004b; see Schlichte / Jung / Siegelberg 2003, 126; Ballentine / Nitzschke 
2005, 17). 
Generally speaking, a feature common to all NSAGs is an increase in 
organized crime as a source of revenue (Schetter 2004b). In this way, a 
political agenda often recedes into the background, and NSAG leaders are 
                                                          
23 If, above all else, the entrenchment of warlords in societal structures is considered, very 
few among them can be regarded as “total spoilers” (Sedra 2002), acting in isolation 
from the societal context and completely torpedoing the peace process for economic 
motives. Most warlords can, however, be seen as “partial spoilers”, at pains to secure 
their position of power, whether by civil or military means. They do not therefore op-
pose the peace process as such, but are intent on playing a key role in the formation of 
the new political elite. 
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able to develop into “dealers in violence”. If, for example, an NSAG is 
primarily interested in individual gain, it will not, in many cases, be sup-
ported by the people (ICHRP 1999, 25). If, on the other hand, it is re-
garded as legitimate because it is supported by the people, the latter are 
likely to provide the members of the NSAG with food and to accept “taxa-
tion” more readily, as long as the result for them is not extreme hardship 
(ICHRP 1999, 22). The pillaging of villages and “simple” forms of crime 
are nonetheless common in most NSAGs (Elwert 2003). 
It should be remembered, however, that the persistence of certain forms of 
conflict-induced economic activity should not be too mechanically or too 
rashly associated solely with the interests of certain actors. In Afghanistan, 
for example, many farmers engaged in opium growing are unaware that 
they are doing wrong because religious leaders have repeatedly approved 
of it as part of the Jihad (see Perry 2005, 11), especially as the cultivation 
of alternative crops is likely to generate far less income. The same is true 
of such warlords as Ismail Khan who refuse to surrender customs revenue 
to the central government in Kabul on the grounds that they need the funds 
for the reconstruction of their provinces (Schetter 2004b, 7, 24). 
3.5 Strategies and tactics 
It is clear from the previous discussion that NSAGs often operate in an 
environment of state erosion and shadow economies, typically facing their 
military opponent in an asymmetrical relationship. All the more signifi-
cant, therefore, are unconventional military strategies in violent conflicts 
in which NSAGs are involved. They sometimes use counterinsurgency 
tactics, deliberately causing uncertainty and fear (e.g. Resistência Na-
cional Moçambicana / RENAMO in Mozambique, the Mujahedin in Af-
ghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua).24 These methods include: 
                                                          
24 In some cases, states have applied a “counterinsurgency principle”, as in Iraq and the 
Middle East, which includes a mixture of paramilitary terror, military presence and tar-
geted social programmes. Examples of measures taken under this principle have been 
forced resettlements in Algeria (by France), the laying of landmines and the use of her-
bicides and napalm to make certain areas uninhabitable (by the USA), and the imitation 
 
Development cooperation and non-state armed groups 
German Development Institute  65
• systematic murder (e.g. Rwanda in 1994); 
• ethnic cleansing (former Yugoslavia in the1990s); 
• destruction of certain areas by 
a)  physical means (laying landmines, destroying civilian buildings, 
hospitals and water sources), 
b)  economic means (famine caused deliberately, forced migration), 
c)  psychological means (desecration of elements of social impor-
tance through the destruction of symbols, religious institutions or 
historical monuments). 
Unconventional military methods are reflected in an increase in the num-
ber of civilian casualties in conflicts with NSAGs as compared with con-
ventional conflicts between armies of the traditional type. At the beginning 
of the 20th century 85 to 90 % of the casualties of war were military per-
sonnel. During the Second World War the proportion of civilian casualties 
rose to about half the total. In the late 1990s some 80 % of the casualties 
of conflict were civilians (see Kaldor 1999, 100; Smith 1997). Refugees in 
1995 numbered 14.4 million, internally displaced persons 5.4 million 
(UNHCR 1995; see Kaldor 1999, 101). 
Sue Williams and Robert Ricigliano have attempted to classify certain 
behaviours of non-state armed groups – in terms of their attitude to politi-
cal power, territory, forms of social and economic support and the use of 
military force – as positive or negative indicators of external actors’ suc-
cessful engagement with NSAGs (Williams / Ricigliano 2005). They thus 
assume that such systematization does indeed enable initial, general con-
clusions to be drawn from certain features of an NSAG’s strategy and 
tactics as to its ability to engage with others and the opportunities and risks 
arising for external actors from such engagement (see Table 3). If, for 
example, an NSAG is characterized by its use of political assassination, a 
profit-oriented war economy or military force within the group, the impact 
on its potential for engagement will be negative. Respect for human rights 
or behaviours reflecting a political agenda, on the other hand, have a posi- 
                                                                                                                         
of these practices by Indonesia in East Timor and by Turkey against the Kurds (Kaldor 
1999, 97). 
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Table 3: Potential for external actors to engage with NSAGs 
Negative indicators Positive indicators 
Political power 
• Disregard for the rule of law 
• Political assassinations 
• Intolerance of differences and 
change 
• Are or were holders of political 
state power  
• Respect for the rule of law, provi-
sion of public services 
• Have political institutions, an 
agenda and candidates 
Territory 
• Carry out “ethnic cleansing” and 
destruction 
• Hold no territory and have no 
control over territory 
• Have territory 
• Developing a political system in 
territory 
• Permit freedom of movement 
within territory 
Social and economic support 
• Isolate themselves from broader 
society 
• Make considerable profit from 
war economy 
• Enjoy support of constituency  
• See termination of conflict as 
means of providing their region or 
constituency with economic bene-
fits  
Use of military force 
• Random victims, many casualties 
• No or ineffective control 
• Undisciplined troops 
• Military force used to undertake 
illegal activities 
• Have potential to use military 
force, but do not use it unnecessar-
ily 
• Respect human rights, appropriate 
treatment of civilians 
• Disciplined troops 
Source:  Williams / Ricigliano (2005) 
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tive impact. Even if the strategies and tactics applied by an NSAG cannot 
be typified, they thus have a direct influence on its potential for engage-
ment and reliability in honouring agreements. 
3.6 Reliability in honouring agreements and willingness to 
resolve conflicts 
Although the classification of NSAGs in rigid categories usually proves 
difficult, the research conducted in this field assumes certain regularities in 
the behaviour of non-state armed groups. The reliability of an NSAG, for 
example, largely depends on the efficiency of its internal organizational 
structures. The ability of organizations whose leaders are able to process 
information flows well to exert pressure on their rank and file members 
differs from that of groups that process information less well. This being 
the case, Policzer (2002, 36) has devised a typology that distinguishes four 
types of internal organizational structure, which are useful for characteriz-
ing NSAGs and determining their reliability in honouring agreements. The 
four types differ according to how much information is disseminated 
within the organization (internal monitoring) and in its relationship with 
the outside world (external monitoring):25  
• bureaucratic coercion, 
• blind coercion, 
• transparent coercion and  
• “hide-and-seek” coercion. 
Figure 2 presents the four types of NSAG internal organization. Cases 
with a high level of internal monitoring and a low level of external moni-
toring occur among groups whose highest-ranking leaders receive good 
information on the operations of the coercive actors, but do not make this 
information available outside the executive. Information is thus usually 
confined to the top of the leadership hierarchy (“bureaucratic coercion”). 
                                                          
25 Internal monitoring relates to information gathered within the group, such as informa-
tion on the behaviour of actors and on compliance with rules. External monitoring con-
cerns information collected outside the direct control of the NSAG leadership.  
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An example of such systematization is the LTTE in Sri Lanka, which 
gives its local actors no scope to depart from the leadership’s directives. 
This style of leadership permits, among other things, highly targeted at-
tacks, as in the case of the murder of India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
in 1991. The negative effects of so strict an organizational structure (e.g. 
inflexibility) are precluded through the exercise of tight internal control 
and the brutal suppression of any internal dissent. 
In contrast, there are cases of low internal and low external monitoring 
(“blind coercion”), in which neither the leadership nor other actors are 
informed of the actions of the agents using force, indicating the absence of 
or ineffective formal organization throughout the group. Agents of these 
groups neither operate under internal supervision, nor are they accountable 
to external groups. An example of this is the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) in Sierra Leone, which, being largely unable to pay its agents, often 
relies on child soldiers and promises of a share of the spoils of war. At the 
same time, middle- and low-ranking RUF commanders take advantage of 
the thin organizational structures to enrich themselves by extorting money 
from the local population. 
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Where the level of information obtained through both internal and external 
monitoring is high (“transparent coercion”), the leadership as well as other 
institutions and groups are likely to be informed from various sources 
about the operations of the coercive agents. In such NSAGs a dialogue on 
access to IDPs, the use of landmines or the scale of liability and the ac-
countability of NSAGs is most likely to be possible. 
The fourth type, finally, comprises cases where, although there is a high 
degree of external monitoring, internal monitoring is neglected (“hide-and-
seek coercion”, here related to the relationship between coercive agents 
and the external monitoring sources). In such cases, knowledge of an 
NSAG’s operations is widely scattered, but is not very profound. This 
situation is often used by an NSAG leadership to maintain a political dis-
tance from controversial operations of its coercive agents (Policzer 2005a). 
The leadership itself then receives information on operations only through 
external channels, such as the media. Information on the outcome of op-
erations (such as the number and identity of fatalities) is easily obtainable, 
detailed information (such as the identity of the agents or their precise 
modus operandi) less so. Examples of such coercion are the Basque 
Euskadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA) and the anti-terror units formed by the 
Spanish government in the 1980s, which were allowed considerable lati-
tude. 
In general, it can be said that most NSAGs operate without a high degree 
of external monitoring in the areas they control (Colombia, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, DR Congo, Sri Lanka and Indonesia) (Policzer 2005a, 19). The 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), for example, exercises strict 
control over supposedly independent sources of information, such as jour-
nalists, judges and public prosecutors, and also over local authorities. The 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) similarly gained 
strict control over independent monitoring groups, as did the Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in the Indonesian province of Aceh. This means 
that an NSAG’s political or economic orientation or motivations based on 
greed or grievance do not have a decisive influence on its reliability. It 
tends to be internal organizational structures that enable an NSAG to hon-
our actual agreements – or prevent it from doing so. 
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Interim balance 
Research on typologies, features, behaviours, etc. of non-state armed 
groups is still very much in its infancy. The findings presented here are not 
therefore comprehensive or exhaustive. Many studies are based on the 
examination of individual NSAGs and certain conflict situations. Nonethe-
less, the work of such academics as Reno, Policzer and Weinstein is in-
formative and, to some extent, pioneering in research terms. It also pro-
vides external actors with at least some categories and some initial indica-
tions of what generalizations are possible. 
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4 Points of contact between development policy and 
NSAGs 
Chapter 2.4 has already presented the fundamental strategic and concep-
tual views of engagement with NSAGs as seen from the angle of various 
policies, including development policy. This chapter sets out to describe 
points of contact actually to be found between development policy and 
NSAGs. The discussion turns first to past situations in which contact was 
made with NSAGs. Against the background of this experience, ideal-type 
objectives of engagement with NSAGs are then identified, before Chapter 
5 takes empirical stock of practical forms of engagement and behaviours 
of development actors. 
4.1 NSAGs as a real challenge for development actors 
Between development actors and NSAGs there are many different points 
of contact. As violent conflicts are to be found in the vast majority of de-
veloping countries with which Germany is cooperating and as NSAGs are 
involved in the vast majority of these situations,26 there are obviously 
direct points of contact with development policy. While development 
actors can endeavour to avoid direct contact, etc. with NSAGs in these 
cases, it will always have to “adopt an attitude” to these groups and situa-
tions. 
The need to engage with NSAGs exists not only for development policy, 
but for all external actors operating in the countries concerned. Humanitar-
ian actors have many years of experience in this sphere. But for foreign 
and defence policy too, engagement with NSAGs is a real challenge. One 
of the reasons for the greater interest in this subject in Germany is that the 
country is becoming increasingly involved in peace missions. In Afghani-
stan, for example, contact has been established between the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Kunduz and the local warlord (General 
Daud), and agreements (verbal guarantees of safety, for example) have 
                                                          
26 See Chapter 2.1. 
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been reached with the participation of Germany’s Foreign Office, Defence 
Ministry, or Armed Forces, BMZ and Home Affairs Ministry. 
Past development policy strategies can be described roughly as follows: 
until the 1990s official development policy sought, implicitly and explic-
itly, to avoid situations in which NSAGs posed a challenge. Development 
policy’s self-image was geared to long-term objectives, meaning that, if at 
all, instruments intended for the short and medium term (humanitarian 
assistance, food and emergency aid and aid for refugees) were to be used 
in conflict situations. Most donors did not start developing strategies for, 
say, post-conflict countries or such principles as “stay engaged” until the 
second half of the 1990s.  
Action under official development policy was clearly geared to govern-
ment actors in countries where NSAGs were in evidence (state bias). By 
and large, the legitimacy of the ruling regimes in Germany’s partner coun-
tries was not questioned. Where NSAGs existed, direct or indirect contact 
with them was avoided. 
This challenge has often taken a different form for humanitarian and non-
governmental actors in the past. Examples of aid organizations gaining 
“negotiated access” to target groups at risk show that direct contact with 
NSAGs has often been unavoidable for humanitarian aid groups and has 
indeed frequently been sought by them. This is especially true of the “ne-
gotiated access” model during Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), when a 
trilateral agreement was reached in 1989 by the United Nations, the Suda-
nese government and the southern Sudanese rebel group (Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army / SPLA).27 Elsewhere, as in the Eritrean-Ethiopian con-
flict (before Eritrea’s independence), humanitarian operations were also 
undertaken in areas that were no longer under government control.  
In other cases, there is documentary evidence of NSAGs wanting to bring 
influence to bear on aid or to use it for military purposes. Munro (2004, 
124), for example, describes a situation during the eastern Zaire operation 
(1996–1998) of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF):  
                                                          
27 For a very good overview of the debate on humanitarian assistance and the OLS exam-
ple, see Glaser (2005) and Akol (2005). 
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“In their desire to regulate the UN agencies’ operations in AFDL28 ter-
ritory, the AFDL authorities often asked, or even ordered, the UN 
agencies in their territory to do things that fell outside of, or even vio-
lated, their mandates. The United Nations naturally refused. UNICEF 
was asked, for example, to provide tents and water facilities for a mili-
tary cantonment, and to finance construction of a road in a military 
sensitive area. The UN agencies’ refusals to comply with such requests 
were in turn interpreted as a lack of willingness to cooperate with the 
AFDL.” 
Since the mid-1990s the situation has changed for development policy. 
Increasing points of contact with NSAGs in the context of demobilization 
measures and crisis prevention and conflict management concepts, for 
example, have given rise to a growing number of situations or the identifi-
cation of more and more countries in which NSAGs have had practical 
relevance. Conceptual and operational considerations and missions in 
unstable situations in which action is increasingly taken parallel to or to-
gether with peace missions demonstrate the growing relevance of such 
situations. The scenarios range from those in which warlords are active in 
the context of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) through wide-
spread violent crime in, say, Colombia to situations in many countries 
where traditional or new authorities have the potential to threaten the use 
of force or experience of doing so (Nigeria, Afghanistan, etc.).  
Despite the rising number of situations in which development actors come 
into contact with NSAGs, virtually no systematic or even incidental 
thought was given to their conduct until the early 2000s. Although the 
study of the subject has grown in recent years,29 it continues to be very 
restrained. The interest taken in the issue has therefore yet to be reflected 
in basic documents (in the form of agreed principles or best practices, for 
instance).  
                                                          
28 Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo. 
29 Particularly worthy of mention are the efforts of Conciliation Resources (London) in the 
shape of an analytical workshop in June 2004, the findings of which have been pub-
lished (Ricigliano 2005), and a Wilton Park conference on the subject of “Engaging 
Armed Groups in Peace Processes” held in December 2005. It should be emphasized, 
however, that on neither occasion was the focus on the specific role of development pol-
icy, but on the broader question of the involvement of external actors. 
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The political relevance of NSAGs as a subject has grown sharply since 
September 11, 2001, and efforts to prosecute terrorist groups have in-
creased significantly. Suitable measures to prevent acts of terrorism and 
prosecute the perpetrators are undoubtedly important. But at the same time 
the scope for engaging with NSAGs perceived and classified as terrorist 
groups has become appreciably narrower. However justified classifications 
of NSAGs may be, the implications for engagement with them may be 
serious. The LTTE, for example, did not attend the international confer-
ence held in June 2003 to decide on incentives for maintaining the cease-
fire and making progress in the peace process, because it had not previ-
ously been able to gain entry to the USA to attend a preparatory confer-
ence. 
4.2 Why should development actors consider engaging 
with NSAGs? 
NSAGs are leading actors in the vast majority of violent conflicts. For 
development policy this means: as regards action taken under development 
policy with a view to preventing crises and managing conflicts (“working 
on conflict”), it is essential for these groups to be taken into account. 
However, the inclusion of NSAGs is equally vital when development 
policy is active in situations in which NSAGs are present, but is not di-
rectly oriented towards violent or potential conflicts (“working in or 
around conflict”). “Ignoring” NSAGs similarly has effects on engagement 
with them, since potential that may at least exist cannot be tapped, and the 
exclusion of NSAGs influences the balance of power in a situation, be-
cause the government, for example, is de facto strengthened as a result or a 
region in which NSAGs are active is not taken into account. 
“Engagement” with NSAGs takes many forms. Negotiations with kidnap-
pers, agreements with NSAGs on transport routes for aid supplies, political 
appeals to NSAGs not to use child soldiers and landmines constitute en-
gagement just as much as deliberate cooperation with them, which may 
have a certain legitimacy in regions where there is no state control. In 
other words, engagement is a value-free concept based solely on points of 
contact between development policy (or other actors) and the groups con-
cerned. 
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Engagement with NSAGs entails opportunities and risks, which may vary 
widely from case to case. This being so, the debate on engagement with 
NSAGs reveals that ignoring them in situations where development and 
other actors are involved results in failure to seize or at least to consider 
potentially creative opportunities and opportunities to exercise influence30 
and possibly in the occurrence of unintended adverse effects. An unin-
tended effect might, for example, consist in uncritical support for a gov-
ernment that exacerbates disparities or influences perceptions and helps to 
radicalize population groups and so to increase an NSAG’s popularity.  
Where such opportunities are concerned, four ideal-type motives that may 
underlie engagement with NSAGs in the development policy context can 
be identified: 
1. Access to target groups: Through engagement with NSAGs devel-
opment policy can pursue the objective of reaching target groups in 
an area. Where areas are partly or completely under NSAG control, 
development actors may be denied access to them without the con-
sent or toleration of the controlling group. 
2. Responsibility for personnel: By working in a region where NSAGs 
are active, local and/or external development cooperation personnel 
may be exposed to considerable danger. Some of the risks can be 
significantly reduced if agreements are reached with the NSAG or ar-
rangements made with groupings or individuals able to play a medi-
ating role. 
3. Commitment to norms: Engagement may also be of interest from the 
development angle as a means of helping to persuade an NSAG to 
commit itself to rules and standards. Examples here are attempts to 
have NSAGs commit themselves to mechanisms intended to prevent 
the use of landmines (e.g. Geneva Call) or the deployment of child 
soldiers. 
4. Conflict transformation: While access to target groups and responsi-
bility for personnel may often be reasons for beginning to engage 
                                                          
30 For arguments of this kind see Capie / Policzer (2004); Ricigliano (2005); Glaser 
(2005); Policzer (2005b). 
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with NSAGs, a further objective may be to contribute to conflict 
transformation. This objective may evolve during engagement and is 
far more ambitious. The conflict transformation motive changes the 
foundations of relations with the NSAG and with the official gov-
ernment, since it places the emphasis on explicit political matters 
over and above humanitarian aspects (access to target groups) and 
security concerns. Furthermore, any interest taken by development 
policy in conflict transformation may encroach further on foreign 
policy’s areas of responsibility in particular, or the options open to 
development policy may have to be joined by diplomatic initiatives if 
it is to have any impact. The motive for conflict transformation is 
therefore particularly complex in political terms. 
The four objectives are in no way mutually exclusive, but can be pursued 
simultaneously or even as complements to one another. 
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5 Empirical stock-taking: how does development 
policy engage with NSAGs? 
Chapter 4 has identified points of contact between NSAGs and develop-
ment policy and ideal-type objectives for development policy’s engage-
ment with NSAGs. In this chapter the emphasis is on taking empirical 
stock of development actors’ engagement with NSAGs. Patterns of en-
gagement encountered (existing modi operandi, etc.), the experience of 
specific types of actor and the associated challenges (opportunities and 
risks inherent in engagement) are discussed in this context. 
So far very few pertinent descriptions or accessible studies of development 
actors’ engagement with NSAGs have been published. The behaviours 
presented here are largely based on an analysis of three country studies 
undertaken on German development cooperation, numerous supplemen-
tary interviews with German governmental and non-governmental devel-
opment actors and interviews conducted outside the development policy 
sphere (German Foreign Office, Defence Ministry, academic institutions, 
etc.). Reference is also made to international experience described in rele-
vant documents and journals or discussed at three conferences organized 
by Conciliation Resources (London), Geneva Call (Geneva) and Wilton 
Park (Steyning, UK). The responses to a confidential survey of interna-
tional donors and relevant non-governmental organizations have similarly 
been analysed. 
This background information makes it possible to reveal features and 
behaviours of development actors engaging with NSAGs that can be as-
signed to certain engagement patterns (5.1) or associated with the actors 
involved (5.2). In addition, opportunities and risks inherent in engagement 
with NSAGs can be identified in general form (5.3). 
5.1 Patterns of engagement 
Development actors engaging with NSAGs 
Development policy engages with NSAGs. In all Germany’s partner coun-
tries in which NSAGs are of any significance development actors engage 
with them. This is true, for example, of German actors in the Casamance/ 
Senegal and in Tajikistan, but equally of all other relevant countries, such 
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as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Uganda, Nigeria, 
Yemen, Israel / Palestine, Afghanistan, Nepal, the Philippines and Colom-
bia. 
As this engagement varies from one case to another, approaches can be 
generalized to only a very limited extent. It concerns  
• the BMZ, which is directly involved in some cases (as in discussions 
on the focal strategy paper in the Casamance); 
• the implementing level, where the GTZ and the German Development 
Service (DED) play a particularly important part in direct communi-
cation through their permanent presence; the same is partly true of the 
KfW at the level of individual measures; 
• local partners of German implementing organizations, since in the 
KfW’s case, for example, it is usually for the partner organization to 
arrange and firmly establish measures within the country (as in Ne-
pal); 
• the political foundations, which invite NSAG representatives, for 
instance, to attend seminars or dialogue fora (e.g. the Konrad Ade-
nauer Foundation in the DRC and the Heinrich Böll Foundation in 
south-eastern Afghanistan, where it supports the Tribal Liaison Of-
fice, which cooperates with traditional tribal leaders); 
• other German non-governmental organizations, such as the Church 
Development Service (EED) and Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, which, 
because of the tasks they perform, have many contacts with NSAGs 
(in Tajikistan, Ethiopia, etc.) and come to agreements (tacit, oral, 
written) with the local power. 
Modi operandi: typology of options for action 
The options open to development actors for engagement with NSAGs can 
be roughly categorized as follows: 
• Avoidance of engagement: Development policy consciously or un-
consciously avoids countries, regions or situations in which NSAGs 
are involved (e.g. Darfur). 
• Disregard / observation / involuntary engagement: Development pol-
icy is present in situations involving NSAGs, but takes no notice of 
them or tries not to become involved by resorting to “non-behaviour” 
or to behaviour geared solely to observation. (e.g. Tajikistan after 
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2001; see Box 7). In a context of this kind, “involuntary engagement” 
may nonetheless occur (as in kidnapping cases). 
• Apolitical action / equidistance: Development policy endeavours to 
make development-related and sometimes even conflict-related con-
tributions, but they are deliberately kept apolitical. Communication 
with NSAGs is often unavoidable, but can be achieved through in-
termediaries (as in the Casamance). 
• Exclusion: Development policy supports the exclusion of the NSAG 
(e.g. general attitude of donors towards Hamas before the parliamen-
tary elections held in Palestine in January 2006). 
• Cooperation: Development policy directly involves NSAGs in differ-
ent ways. This may consist in direct account being taken of them in 
measures and dialogue fora or in their acting as cooperation partners. 
The advantages and disadvantages of one or other option very much de-
pend on the circumstances in each case. 
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Box 7:  NSAGs in Tajikistan – a subject for development actors? 
Tajikistan is an example of a situation where it is not immediately obvious to 
external actors that NSAGs may be playing an important role. The power of 
central government is challenged by armed groups that neither exist as a collec-
tive nor can be described in their entirety as clearly legitimate or illegitimate, 
and not even as state or non-state groups. The legitimacy of state action itself is 
also questionable, when action to enable the state to act is deliberately taken at 
the expense of political plurality and agreed power-sharing principles. 
From 1992 to 1997 Tajikistan experienced a civil war ostensibly due to dis-
agreement over the politico-ideological foundations on which the infant state, 
the poorest to emerge from the former Soviet Union, was to be based. How-
ever, ethnoregional differences formed one of the main distinguishing features 
between the most important parties to the conflict. After the 1997 peace agree-
ment, it took some time for the coalition government formally established from 
the old power elite and the former opposition to replace the fragmented order of 
the civil war with an effective state monopoly of power. Large parts of the 
country remained de facto under the control of local warlords until 2001. As 
the war being waged by the international coalition troops against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan then accelerated the consolidation of the power of central govern-
ment in neighbouring Tajikistan, many observers assume that the state monop-
oly of power has now been largely restored. Nonetheless, reliable conflict 
analyses continue to refer to the significant role played by regional “strong 
men” or “big men”, heirs to the warlords active during the civil war, and some-
times identical with them, and although some now occupy official government 
posts, they still act on their own account. They may be integrated into the state 
as a whole through vertical patronage networks headed by the president, but 
each regional subunit constitutes a separate political system, which explains 
why forms of governance vary widely among the units.  
Conceptually, then, the problem that arises is how to decide precisely when it is 
still (or no longer) appropriate to regard regionally or locally influential actors 
as NSAGs. However, it is also extremely important for external development 
actors to be very well informed, especially in post-conflict countries, about the 
quality and workings of national and local governance structures and networks. 
Only then can unintended effects in relation to NSAGs and other groups be 
avoided (e.g. strengthening warlords who may contribute to political destabili-
zation, favouring one group at the expense of others). 
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Blind spots vs contours in engagement with NSAGs 
For German and international development policy it is possible to identify 
NSAG cases which are comparatively “more accessible”, while other 
situations are more complex and, above all, politically more sensitive.  
The probable reasons for this are that in the “special case” of Sri Lanka, 
for example, there was, at least for a time, a very wide-ranging interna-
tional consensus on engagement with the LTTE. In other cases, the condi-
tions for making possible points of contact transparent do not exist, or only 
to a limited extent. This is due to the fact that some conflict situations are 
extremely politicized (e.g. Israel / Palestine), where this public transpar-
ency might have hardly foreseeable effects among the parties directly 
involved in the conflict, in the regional environment and even among other 
external actors. 
Difficult environmental conditions and processes due to NSAGs are, to 
some extent at least, not documented by development actors, but rather 
clarified informally within the various institutions or reported to the BMZ 
orally (when, for example, an NSAG attempts to prevent a development 
cooperation measure because it does not benefit the local population, or 
when it is unclear which specific local non-governmental organizations are 
the beneficiaries of development funds and an NSAG possibly benefits as 
a result). 
Levels of engagement: NSAG relevance from strategy to implementation 
Engagement with NSAGs may occur at different levels of development 
policy: 
• Strategy level: German development policy has yet to take any direct 
conceptual interest in approaches to NSAGs. However, the Cross-
sectoral Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and 
Peace-building in German Development Cooperation (BMZ 2005b) 
and the Cross-sectoral Strategy for Development-Oriented Emer-
gency and Transitional Aid (BMZ 2005a) address situations in which 
NSAGs play a part (as when there is no government in a country with 
which to hold discussions).  
Much the same is true of the country level. Here too, there have so far 
been no explicit references to NSAGs in country concepts or focal 
strategy papers. 
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• Political level: At political level – i.e. at places where levels of politi-
cal leadership are visibly involved or participating – there may be dif-
ferent forms of communication and cooperation: 
– Official political discussions with NSAG representatives among 
others.  
– Participation by an NSAG in government consultations or nego-
tiations, provided that this is accepted or even wanted by the offi-
cial partner. 
– A mechanism comparable to policy dialogue and related to the 
NSAG’s action (e.g. attitude to human rights). 
– Development policy endeavours to be politically transparent to 
the parties to a conflict and to population groups. This transpar-
ency requirement can be seen, for example, in the information 
policy towards the Sri Lankan government or the Israeli govern-
ment (regarding activities with the Palestinian side). In the 
Casamance information provided on project goals is probably al-
ready helping to reduce distrust. 
• Operational level: There are many patterns of engagement during the 
preparation and implementation of development cooperation meas-
ures: 
– In the case of operational measures three project/programme types 
can be identified: 
(i) measures intended to make a direct contribution to the peace 
process and necessitating direct contact with the NSAG; 
(ii) measures able or intended to develop channels of communica-
tion to the NSAG through the provision of benefits. The Heinrich 
Böll Foundation is cooperating with traditional tribal leaders in 
the Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan. Thought has similarly been 
given to cooperation with religious leaders in Nigeria. This ap-
proach is meant to create scope for strengthening political inter-
ests (promotion of democratic elements, etc.). 
(iii) Measures bringing benefits to areas under NSAG control and 
therefore necessitating engagement with the NSAG. This category 
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includes, for example, the German technical assistance provided 
in the Casamance/Senegal. 
– In some cases the NSAG acts as a project partner. 
– Deutsche Welthungerhilfe comes to tacit, oral or written agree-
ments with the ruling power before implementing its measures.  
– For the security of seconded and local personnel there are many 
different forms of communication. For the GTZ’s activities in the 
Casamance/Senegal contact with the Mouvement des forces dé-
mocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) is necessary for security 
reasons. This is done, however, by such means as an indirect ad-
vance announcement of a visit to the project area. 
The KfW sometimes uses security consultants (Nepal, Colombia), 
who are brought in to liaise with an NSAG when problems arise. 
In Colombia, for instance, guerrillas impeded the implementation 
of a KfW project on the grounds that it did benefit the people. The 
KfW then brought in a consultant, who contacted the guerrillas. 
The KfW’s Middle Marsyangdi water project in Nepal had to be 
shut down in 2005 because of serious security problems. The con-
struction work had previously been brought to an almost complete 
standstill from August 2004 until early 2005 by threats from the 
Maoists. Informal agreements between the Germans and Nepalese 
on the one hand and the Maoists on the other aimed at minimizing 
the effects on the project had proved unsuccessful. 
For the peace experts of the German Development Service (DED) 
and for various non-governmental organizations the integration of 
activities into local partner structures is decisive if security risks 
for the personnel are to be minimized.  
• Promotion of international mechanisms: International fora and 
mechanisms for persuading NSAGs to commit themselves to rules 
and standards form another area that is promoted by development ac-
tors. With its efforts to ban landmines, Geneva Call is a pioneer here. 
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The exchange of experience initiated by Conciliation Resources,31 
supported by donors and attended by NSAG representatives, repre-
sentatives of the governments of the countries concerned and repre-
sentatives of the research community is another option for action in 
this area. 
Dependence of engagement on the specific case and its micro conditions 
Any situation in which NSAGs play a part is characterized by extremely 
specific conditions. Although violent conflicts and changed strategies of 
violence (deterritorialization of conflicts, violent conflict as a means of 
generating revenue, etc.) have global characteristics,32 there is a simultane-
ity of location-specific conditions (see von Trotha 2005). These specific 
conditions lead to a wide variation in room for manoeuvre in relations with 
NSAGs on the spot. Ultimately, the approach adopted by, say, a GTZ staff 
member largely depends on how he or she assesses the situation and the 
risks. An added factor is that the micro conditions in a given situation are 
sometimes subject to very rapid change. The local impact of certain events 
(such as government announcements in the capital) can, as a rule, be re-
corded and assessed only in the actual local situation. 
For development and other external actors this means that generalizations 
are appropriate and possible to only a very limited extent.  
 
                                                          
31 See Ricigliano (2005). 
32 For more details see Chapter 3. 
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5.2 Experience of specific actors 
Governments still important for room for manoeuvre 
The room for manoeuvre that development policy enjoys in relation to 
NSAGs is usually determined by the government of the country con-
cerned. This is especially true of countries with a generally efficient and 
legitimized government. A development policy approach explicitly op-
posed by the government is hardly conceivable or feasible. 
Box 8:  Examples of engagement with NSAGs  
– Casamance – selective contacts. Socio-economic development for peace-
building in the Casamance is a focal area of German development coopera-
tion with Senegal; the German contribution can be largely described as 
“working in conflict” or, where certain activities are concerned, “working on 
conflict”. The MFDC is a rather scattered armed group in the region, having 
little chance of taking joint action and capable of exercising territorial control 
in very few places. The Senegalese government expects donors to adopt a re-
strained attitude towards the MFDC. German development actors’ engage-
ment with the MFDC tends to be limited and indirect and mainly to concern 
day-to-day activities and contacts in preparation for projects. Although not 
documented as such, this strategy currently entails the smallest risks (no “na-
ïve enhancement of the MFDC’s status”, avoidance of inducements to en-
gage in apparent peace processes (“mediation rents”, etc.)) and the greatest 
opportunities (especially local conflict management options). The scattered 
nature of the MFDC is very typical of many armed groups, particularly in 
Africa. 
– Tajikistan – grey area between state and non-state actor. The Tajik warlords 
are relatively well integrated into the state structure and can therefore hardly 
be described as NSAGs these days. This being the case, development and 
other external actors do not place them in the state/non-state categories. Con-
sequently, there is no “recognition problem” where these groups are con-
cerned. External actors (including those involved in German development 
cooperation) were quick to take the Tajik government at its word when it 
suggested a transition from the warlord politics of the civil war to post-
conflict stabilization. The positive feature of this conduct is that it meant 
greater openness for engagement with the warlords. Provided that this does 
not obscure the existing political risk factors and potential for conflict within 
society, this highly formal image of the state may be advantageous. 
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Where governments are de facto weak, the monopoly of power is severely 
restricted and/or legitimacy is lacking, there may be some room for ma-
noeuvre in other respects. In development-oriented emergency and transi-
tional aid (EONÜ), the BMZ has had a more flexible option for taking 
action in such situations since 2005. Accordingly,  
“[in] exceptional circumstances, however, development-oriented emer-
gency and transitional aid can take on some tasks of Financial or Tech-
nical Cooperation. This is especially appropriate in countries where, 
for example, no government exists with which one can reasonably co-
operate. In other situations, political necessity may make it advisable to 
stay below a level at which there is visible official development coop-
eration.” (BMZ 2005a, 6) 
State/non-state development policy: who engages with NSAGs? 
The distinction between a state and a non-state development actor in en-
gagement with an NSAG may be of considerable importance. Quite obvi-
ously, international non-governmental organizations have far more latitude 
in developing forms of engagement with NSAGs. Politically, there is 
scope here for the political foundations in particular. The extent to which it 
is used on any major scale cannot be accurately determined from the sur-
veys that have been conducted; it is used to some extent at least. Such non-
governmental organizations as Deutsche Welthungerhilfe clearly have 
pragmatic options for reaching target groups with NSAG involvement. 
Many years of experience have already been gained in this field. 
For official development actors the limits to the room for manoeuvre are 
sometimes more clearly recognized than in the case of non-governmental 
organizations, but it certainly exists. “Closer” engagement is likely to be 
problematical mainly when a conflict situation has become particularly 
“bogged down”, communication with the NSAG is explicitly unwanted, 
the approach does not have the firm backing of an international consensus, 
and the NSAGs have been guilty of particularly serious violations of rules 
and values (acts of terrorism and the like).  
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5.3 Opportunities and risks inherent in engagement with 
NSAGs 
In general, engagement with NSAGs creates opportunities, but it also 
entails risks. A cost-benefit analysis of engagement in a situation that 
necessitates engagement with an NSAG is, as a general rule, an appropri-
ate means of exposing the possible effects of the approach envisaged.  
However, determining which are the greater, the opportunities or the risks 
associated with a given approach, is possible, at best, on the basis of plau-
sibility considerations. Cost-benefit analyses are hampered not least by 
decision-making processes within an NSAG, which are almost or entirely 
incomprehensible to outsiders. 
The potential opportunities presented by engagement arise from the mo-
tives and aims pursued by development actors in this context (see Chapter 
4.2). Risks may be inherent in a certain de facto enhancement of the inter-
national status of NSAGs as “recognized” interlocutors following their 
engagement with external actors. Engagement, and especially cooperation, 
with an NSAG may also mean that this approach is interpreted by the 
government concerned as taking sides and that possible influence as a 
“neutral” partner is consequently reduced. If engagement means that re-
sources reach areas to which NSAGs cannot de facto be prevented from 
gaining access, the balance of power and resources may be affected and an 
NSAG’s ability to use force unwittingly strengthened. Furthermore, en-
gagement with an NSAG entails risks for a donor’s internal debate, since 
engagement with many NSAGs may constitute a pronounced political risk. 
In any weighing up of opportunities and risks, however, the costs and 
benefits of not becoming involved or of engagement/cooperation biased 
towards the government must also be considered. Table 4 summarizes 
some of the basic opportunities and risks. 
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Table 4: Opportunities and risks inherent in engagement with NSAGs 
Opportunities Risks 
– Access to target groups / humani-
tarian objectives 
– Conflict management options / 
influence on peace processes 
– Increased security for local and 
seconded personnel 
– Reduction of blind spots / more 
information on NSAG-controlled 
areas 
– Contact with / access to ruling 
power (where no government  
exists, for example) 
– De facto enhancement of status / 
legitimation of NSAGs 
– Narrowing of options for action if 
engagement with NSAGs is perceived 
as “taking sides” 
– “Feeding the conflict” 
– “Naïveté” about opportunities for 
exercising influence  
– Restriction of the country’s sover-
eignty / massive interference 
– Loss of credibility owing to “coopera-
tion” with NSAGs 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations for German 
development policy 
Engaging with NSAGs 
NSAGs are leading actors in many of the countries with which Germany is 
cooperating under its development policy. Much the same is true of other 
externally oriented policies, especially diplomacy and defence policy. 
Points of contact also exist with the internal departments (above all, the 
fight against terrorism and police training). 
The term “NSAG” covers a wide range of groupings of relevance to de-
velopment policy in many different ways. Traditional authorities (Nigeria, 
Afghanistan, etc.) that are capable of using force cannot be compared to 
the manifestations of organized crime in Colombia. The scattered nature of 
the MFDC, for example, is hardly comparable to the quasi-governmental 
nature of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Nor do the local 
authorities in Tajikistan that have the means to use force have much in 
common with the Al Qaeda terrorist network. 
Engaging with NSAGs, then, does not automatically mean any kind of 
recognition or legitimation of the objectives of these groups, their behav-
iours or the means they use. The aim is rather that development policy 
consider its attitude towards these groupings carefully so as to take advan-
tage of any room for manoeuvre and so exercise constructive influence, or 
to avoid any adverse effects. 
The international community has so far been very reluctant to face up to 
the challenges arising from the collapse of states, the existence of quasi-
states and the NSAGs associated with such situations. When asked how it 
intends to cope with this phenomenon, it answers with references to rules 
and principles that are often no longer appropriate to such phenomena as 
long-lasting states-within-states or conflict as a means of generating reve-
nue and the deterritorialization of armed groups. The frequent call33 for the 
identification of new and creative approaches to coping with these situa-
                                                          
33 See, for example, Herbst (2000, 260), who calls for “more space for alternatives than 
has been the case in the past”. Similarly, Kingston / Spears (2004a) and Ricigliano 
(2005, 8 f.). 
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tions is justified. This in no way amounts to “naïvely” enhancing the status 
of such groups or of assigning to them, say, “mediation rents”, i.e. in-
ducements to initiate apparent peace processes: it is a question of identify-
ing ways of meeting these challenges more appropriately than in the past. 
Strategy elements for development actors engaging with NSAGs 
Each case should be taken on its merits when the conditions for and risks 
and opportunities inherent in development and other external actors’ en-
gagement with NSAGs are assessed. Nonetheless, some advice can be 
given to development actors: 
• Territorial control: Engagement with groups completely or largely in 
control of an area may be necessary at least from a humanitarian 
viewpoint and for gaining access to information. Such engagement 
may concern negotiated access to an area or even cooperation 
(NSAGs as cooperation partners). Territorial control may be exer-
cised, above all, by guerrilla and rebel movements and warlords. 
Some NSAGs with effective territorial control have established quasi-
state structures (“states-within-states” 34).35 
• Form in which force is used and threatened: The more an NSAG uses 
or threatens to use force (extending to acts of terrorism), the less 
likely it is that direct engagement will be appropriate or wise. In cases 
of abduction in particular it is evident, however, that engagement 
(communication on demands, etc.) with these groups or at least with 
intermediaries may be appropriate and necessary. Nonetheless, con-
siderable importance must be attached to the manner in which and 
scale on which force is used. 
• State or non-state actor: The example of Tajikistan (but also the 
parastatal militias in Darfur/Sudan and other situations) shows that it 
may be wiser to leave the state to take responsibility for apparent 
“non-state” armed groups and not to ease the pressure on it by draw-
ing a line beyond which it ceases to be responsible. When it comes to 
                                                          
34 For this debate see the fine overview in Kingston / Spears (2004b). 
35 See the LTTE example. In the areas concerned the LTTE not only has a de facto mo-
nopoly of power but also maintains functioning administrative structures, with tax-like 
levies being collected. The LTTE structure has also been able to cope fairly effectively 
with the direct consequences of the tsunami. 
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definitions, there are “grey areas”, which should not, however, lead in 
development practice to the state being relieved of any of its respon-
sibility towards armed groups with which it is in contact. 
• Value added by engagement: Engagement is not an end in itself and 
should be sought only when constructive influence seems possible. 
Development and other actors should be able to identify the value 
possibly added by their engagement with NSAGs – as such and in 
comparison with other actors. The risk of “mediation rents” and the 
like where a “peace process” may become a major source of revenue 
and thus an end in itself should always be borne in mind. 
• One’s own rules and values: One’s own system of rules and values 
should be clear to all actors involved. One’s position on ways in 
which force is used and on any failure to respect human rights (child 
soldiers, landmines, etc.) must always be beyond doubt.  
• International backing for engagement: Engagement with an NSAG 
requires very extensive international agreement (EU, other donor 
fora, etc.) on the approach to the groups concerned. A common atti-
tude is needed to bring about a change in the conduct of NSAGs (and 
possibly other parties to the conflict, such as the government), and 
this cannot be achieved unless the external actors adopt a virtually 
unanimous position. As the circumstances are, as a rule, politically 
highly sensitive, it is also important to maintain credibility by acting 
with the support of an international consensus. This credibility is im-
portant for the approach adopted in the region concerned, for action at 
international level and also for any debates in one’s own country. 
• Shortages of information on NSAGs: Information on the goals, nature, 
structure and approach of NSAGs is vital for fundamental aspects of 
engagement with them. In many cases, it is hard or impossible to 
know whether a certain local NGO in the Palestinian territories is a 
sub-organization of Hamas, how far the unofficial warlord structure 
still exists in Tajikistan, how reliable the Maoists in Nepal are, etc. 
The information available to the BMZ (and other actors) on these 
questions may not be sufficient in every case. Where German devel-
opment policy is deeply involved, any sources of information that 
provide a better insight are very important. 
• Intermediaries and civilian NSAG contacts: In many cases it may be 
an option to communicate with NSAGs indirectly, through intermedi-
aries, for example. This is a way to make it clear that there can be no 
direct contact with NSAGs for development policy purposes. Another 
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option may consist in confining communication or cooperation to 
specific “civilian” structures of an NSAG, although it can be as-
sumed, as a general rule, that the dividing lines between the civilian 
and military spheres of an NSAG are fluid and that civilian 
“branches” are deliberately established to gain access to resources or 
attract political attention. 
• Basis of legitimacy of NSAGs and the state: Legitimacy is a factor 
that must be considered when it comes to deciding whether and, if so, 
in what form engagement is appropriate. The legitimacy dimension is 
often complex. It should be borne in mind that the legitimacy ques-
tion must be raised with respect not only to the NSAG but also to 
government actors. Examples reveal that traditional authorities in, 
say, Afghanistan or occasionally some ethnic militias in Nigeria (see 
Agbu 2004) have had a certain legitimacy. Conversely, a number of 
other examples point to the lack of legitimacy of ruling governments 
(e.g. Ethiopia). 
Another challenge arises when an NSAG undergoes a transformation 
process having become a legitimate “state actor” as a result of elec-
tions (see Asseburg 2006). In the case of Hamas, which won the elec-
tions decisively in January 2006, the question is, for example, how 
likely it is that this grouping will escalate the violence or be prepared 
to use force despite its legitimation by the elections. Much the same 
applies to the transition of the Somali NSAG structure into “state” 
structures. 
• Willingness for dialogue / negotiation: Engagement may depend on 
how seriously an NSAG is interested in negotiation or dialogue. 
NSAGs that are pursuing political objectives tend to be more open to 
discussions and negotiations.36 Where the possibility of a true dia-
logue exists, there are better chances of exerting political pressure, 
which often cannot even be brought to bear on governments to the 
same extent.  
• Role of local development cooperation partners: In some situations it 
is not the development actor who arranges engagement with an 
NSAG, but primarily the local partner structure. This is true in the 
                                                          
36 A number of interesting cases are to be found in Ricigliano (2005). 
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case of Financial Cooperation, but also of the German Development 
Service (DED) and various non-governmental organizations. It is 
hard to say how these local partners in fact arrange engagement with 
NSAGs. 
Recommendations 
For the BMZ and other development actors the following recommenda-
tions can be derived from the above analysis: 
• The subject of NSAGs is very important for action taken under the 
development policy in many countries and regions. It should be paid 
sufficient attention by the BMZ at executive and working level. E-
qually, the relevant units of the implementing organizations should 
familiarize themselves with the issue. 
• The subject is complex and, in many respects, highly sensitive. The 
available knowledge, on the other hand, is still very limited. The 
BMZ should therefore make every effort in Germany and at interna-
tional level (within the DAC, for example) to promote an exchange of 
experience. At empirical level in particular there is a great deal of 
catching up to do if patterns of behaviour, shortcomings, etc. are to be 
recognized. 
• The BMZ might join with other government departments (especially 
the Foreign Office and Defence Ministry) in exchanging experience 
of engaging with NSAGs. A discussion of the subject within the In-
terdepartmental Group on Civil Crisis Prevention should be consid-
ered. 
• Promoting such initiatives as Geneva Call and specialist conferences 
(e.g. Conciliation Resources) attended by actors directly involved 
(NSAGs, governments concerned, etc.) is an important means of pus-
hing the topic forward. 
• The BMZ should prepare a hand-out giving the expert public and 
implementing organizations advice on engagement with NSAGs. 
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